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ABSTRACT
Since its publication in 1953, Henry Hart’s famous article, The 
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, subsequently referred to as simply “The
Dialogue,” has served as the leading scholarly treatment of 
congressional control over the federal courts. Now in its seventh 
decade, much has changed since Hart first wrote.  This Article examines 
what lessons The Dialogue still holds for its readers circa 2020. 
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INTRODUCTION
It seems that we—we’ve been replicating what, among lawyers anyway,
is a famous dialogue between Professors Wechsler and Hart about 
whether Congress can achieve unconstitutional objectives by 
preventing federal courts from adjudicating claims that those 
provisions are unconstitutional.1 
—Chief Justice John Roberts 
A. 1953 and Beyond 
1953 was a remarkable year for federal courts scholarship. Hart 
and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System—“probably 
the most important and influential casebook ever written”—was 
published.2 That work still shapes the field of federal courts
scholarship.3 Earlier in the year, Henry Hart published his famous
article The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic (universally referred to as “The 
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–17, Patchak v. Zinke (Patchak II), 138 S. Ct. 897
(2018) (No. 16-498). 
2. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 688 (1989) (book review); id. at
690 n.11 (“This extraordinary work is perhaps the most influential casebook ever written.” 
(quoting P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 43 (1982))); see also id. at 689–91 (collecting
accolades). The casebook is now in its seventh edition. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F.
MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (7th ed. 2015) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER]. All 
casebook references are to the current edition unless otherwise noted. 
3. One of its current editors wrote that he could “claim no credit for the book’s most 
extraordinary influence, which flows predominantly from the first edition . . . and from the first
edition’s success in defining the field as we now conceive it.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why and How
to Teach Federal Courts Today, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 693, 696 (2009) (footnote omitted); see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 
960 (1994) (discussing Hart and Wechsler’s “[p]uzzling [p]ersistence”).















   
     
 
 
    





 32019] JURISDICTION STRIPPING CIRCA 2020 
Dialogue”) in the Harvard Law Review, which had appeared earlier as 
part of the casebook.4 My project is to examine just what The 
Dialogue’s central legal ideas have to teach us after more than six-and-
one half decades.5 
Hart (like Wechsler) had god-like status in the middle of the last 
century. As a student of Felix Frankfurter, a law clerk to Justice
Brandeis, and an anti-positivist (in the late 1950s debate between Lon 
Fuller and H.L.A. Hart), he was—and still is—the acknowledged
standard bearer for the Legal Process School of statutory 
interpretation.6 For decades of law school students, Chapter Four of 
the Hart and Wechsler casebook, which addresses the general topic of 
congressional control over Article III court subject-matter jurisdiction,
has been the casebook’s sanctum sanctorum. The Dialogue long stood 
at its very center. It was reprinted in the book’s second (1973) and third 
(1988) editions, with citations added and some footnotes annotated, 
modified, or eliminated. Subsequent editions have drawn upon The 
Dialogue extensively.
Congress, Hart believed, had wide latitude in prescribing the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the Article III courts. But it was not
unlimited. Hart’s specific concern was with congressional misuse of its 
authority to “regulate rights — rights to judicial process, whatever 
those are, and substantive rights generally.”7 It was, Hart insisted,
“monstrous illogic . . . . [t]o build up a mere power to regulate
jurisdiction into a power to affect rights having nothing to do with
jurisdiction.”8 Yet, Hart said, Supreme Court opinions seemingly
endorsed such freewheeling authority: “[They] are full of what may be 
thought to be injudiciously unqualified statements of [such a] power.”9 
“[T]aken at face value,” he asked, how can such statements be 
“reconciled with the basic presuppositions of a regime of law and of
4. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: 
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953) [hereinafter The Dialogue].
 5. Since Hart wrote The Dialogue, there has been a scholarly outpouring bearing upon this
topic, which includes my own work. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Monaghan, Marbury].
 6. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374–80 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994). 
7. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1371. 
8. Id.
 9. Id. at 1362 (emphasis added). 
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4  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
constitutional government?”10 The Dialogue set out to examine these 
problems. 
The question is what The Dialogue still has to teach us generations
after it was written. That inquiry remains important. To be sure, the 
current horizon portends no large-scale, rights-altering legislative 
attacks on Article III subject-matter jurisdiction nor major limitations
on the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over the state courts or
on district court jurisdiction in school desegregation, school prayer, or 
abortion cases.11 Nonetheless, Hart’s concerns remain constants on the 
legal landscape, now appearing, we might say, at the retail level. For 
example, in Felker v. Turpin, the Supreme Court rejected an attempt 
by Congress to eliminate the Court’s review of court of appeals rulings 
denying second or successive habeas corpus applications for leave to
appeal.12 In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court likewise rejected an effort 
to limit Article III courts’ habeas jurisdiction.13 
The recent 2017 Supreme Court Term was quite literally filled 
with decisions central to The Dialogue. In the second iteration of 
Patchak v. Zinke, mentioned in the epigraph, a splintered Court 
sustained a congressional limitation on the district court’s (and
ultimately on the Court itself) ability to hear cases about a particular 
piece of land, with a four-member plurality characterizing the
limitation as permissible jurisdiction stripping.14 In Jennings v.
Rodriguez, a divided Court addressed another topic dear to The 
Dialogue—administrative detention in the immigration and removal 
context.15 In Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy
Group, LLC, the Court, again divided, upheld administrative, rather
than judicial, revocation of a patent.16 In Ortiz v. United States, the
Justices debated at length whether the Court’s appellate jurisdiction
could constitutionally attach to judgments of the Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Services.17 Finally, despite numerous opportunities to do so,
10. Id. at 1363. 
11. While such legislation has been frequently proposed in Congress, it rarely passes. See
Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 895–97 (1984) (listing examples).
12. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658 (1996).
13. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796–98 (2008). 
14. Patchak v. Zinke (Patchak II), 138 S. Ct. 897, 907–08 (2018). 
15. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018).
16. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374–75 
(2018). 
17. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2173–78 (2018). 

















      
  
  
    
 
  
     
 52019] JURISDICTION STRIPPING CIRCA 2020 
no decision during either the 2017 or the 2018 Term accorded actual
deference to administrative law formulation; a result that would have,
I believe, pleased Hart. 
B. The Dialogue: A Preliminary Look 
Looking back at The Dialogue, a reader would start from the 
realization that Hart’s world now has many new dimensions.18 But far 
more importantly for our purposes is another realization: although
separately published, The Dialogue was never intended to be a 
comprehensive, stand-alone treatment of its subject matter. It was
designed simply to be a part—and I emphasize part—of a single 
casebook chapter that contained extensive materials on Congress and
the federal courts.19 Indeed, The Dialogue itself can be described as 
largely an annotated review of several then-recent Supreme Court 
decisions, discussed below, assessing their cogency against a few 
strongly held, bedrock convictions. And, while universally 
characterized as “The Dialogue,” it, like many other “dialogues,” was 
in no sense a real colloquy. Rather, it was an interior monologue, a
conversation Hart was having with himself. A conversation, ultimately,
about important and enduring legal issues that will perhaps always
escape final closure. Hart himself was certainly under no illusion that
he had “worked it all out,” which accounts for The Dialogue’s 
frequently tentative, exploratory, tension-filled, and often obscure 
nature.20 
Hart’s inquiry was undertaken against the then-existing legal 
landscape. By 1953, the basic structure of our regulatory, welfare,
contract, and grant-awarding administrative state was in place. There 
existed, however, a parallel, deeply ingrained recognition of the 
judicial role in protecting traditional conceptions of liberty and 
property against unlawful executive and administrative deprivation.
Recognition of that judicial role was real then and is still real now. An
important aspect of the modern administrative state consists of federal 
18. For example, whole new areas have come into focus, such as the relationship between
the Article III courts and supranational tribunals. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III
and Supranational Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (2007) (discussing whether 
supranational judicial review runs afoul of Article III). 
19. Hart’s course on federal courts was taught at noon on Friday and Saturday. It was fondly 
referred to as “Darkness at Noon.” 
20. The Dialogue does not “proffer final answers but . . . ventilate[s] the questions,” and it 
takes “full advantage . . . of the ambivalence of the dialogue form.” The Dialogue, supra note 4,
at 1363.  










    
 
   
 
     
  
   
 
   
 
    








   
   
  
   
     
   
     
 
  
6  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
“adjudication” imposing duties on private parties that, at least in 
significant part, occurs outside of Article III tribunals in administrative 
agencies and “legislative” courts.21 This development was—and still 
is—seen by many as threatening the traditional judicial rule-of-law role
in protecting liberty and property rights from unjustifiable 
governmental invasion.
In the end, The Dialogue made no fundamental challenge to the
then-emergent administrative state. Hart accepted its main outlines. 
His understanding of Article III and other potential constitutional 
limits on administrative adjudication was largely akin to Justice
Brandeis’s dissent in Crowell v. Benson22 and his concurrence in St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States.23 However, Hart famously
postulated a constitutionally mandated “essential role” for the 
Supreme Court.24 Moreover, he strongly resisted various formulations 
of the “public rights” doctrine regarding the finality of executive or 
administrative (hereinafter collectively “administrative”) deprivations 
of liberty and property.25 
21. Notice-and-comment rulemaking as a mode of imposing duties on private parties, so
important in the current administrative state, largely postdates The Dialogue. 
22. Justice Brandeis’s view of the limitations on non-Article III courts was based on
constitutional due process, rather than on Article III: 
There is in [Article III] nothing which requires any controversy to be determined as of
first instance in the federal District Courts. The jurisdiction of those courts is subject to
the control of Congress. . . . If there be any controversy to which the judicial power 
extends that may not be subjected to the conclusive determination of [non-Article III
courts], it is . . . because, under certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement
of due process is a requirement of judicial process.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 86–87 (1932) (footnote omitted) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23. Justice Brandeis drew a distinction between questions of law and questions of fact for 
judicial review of non-Article III courts: 
The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have some court 
decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied . . . . But supremacy of law does 
not demand that the correctness of every finding of fact to which the rule of law is to
be applied shall be subject to review by a court.
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
Hart was law clerk to Justice Brandeis in the 1935–36 Term. 
24. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1365. 
25. Recently, there has been an attempt to widen the focus of American constitutional law
development through the lens of the distinction between law and conventions. Conventions are
treated as “obligatory” norms governing the conduct of public officials, but norms that are not 
judicially enforceable. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional
Conventions in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1854 (2013). The English origin is, of
course, A.V. DICEY, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, first published in 1885. See generally MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE BRITISH
CONSTITUTION 31–33, 41, 53 (2013) (discussing obligatory constitutional norms in Britain). I put
this discussion to the side because Hart’s focus was wholly court centered. But for a recent 
discussion of the intersection between conventions and the actual development of constitutional
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In what I hope provides greater clarity, I have slightly rearranged 
and recaptioned The Dialogue’s headings and set out Hart’s central 
conclusions.
I. Introduction
1. The “essential role” of the Supreme Court 
2. Congressional latitude with respect to matters such as the
decision to employ the Article III courts, control over 
remedies, and the timing of judicial review 
II. Limitation on the Jurisdiction of Enforcement Courts and Courts 
in the Position of Enforcement Courts: The Possibility of Judicial
Control 
III. Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Enforcement Courts: Their 
Validity 
1. Civil Defendants—Crowell
2. Criminal Defendants—Yakus, Falbo
IV. Denial of Jurisdiction: Withholding from Plaintiffs Affirmative 
Governmental Aid 
1. Plaintiffs Wanting to Enforce Other Private Persons’ 
Duties
2. Plaintiffs Complaining About Decisions in Connection 
with Non-Coercive Governmental Programs
3. Plaintiffs Complaining of Extra-Judicial Governmental 
(i.e. Administrative) Coercion 
V. Conclusion—The constitutional importance of the state courts 
The Dialogue yoked together several separate topics. This Article
will focus on its three main conclusions. Although each presented 
distinctive issues, Hart apparently understood all three to present a 
danger of impermissible jurisdictional and remedial manipulation by 
Congress. 
1. The Essential Role of the Supreme Court. Hart famously but 
quite summarily asserted (and this Article will more elaborately 
defend) the claim that the Supreme Court has a constitutionally 
mandated “essential role” in the constitutional system. 
law doctrine, see Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65
UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1432–35 (2018), and Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric
Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915, 920–26 (2018). 
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The central concern of The Dialogue, however, was not the 
Supreme Court; rather, it focuses on governmental, particularly
administrative, interference (in Hart’s phrase, “coercion”) with
traditional—and perhaps evolving—forms of liberty and property. 
When an Article III court was asked to play a role in enforcing that 
coercion, Hart characterized the court as an “enforcement court,” and
he focused on the court’s duties, including those specifically derived 
from Article III. When administrative agencies sought to impose such
coercion and to bypass altogether the Article III courts in that process 
(for Hart, “extra-judicial coercion”), Hart addressed the possibility of
judicial access. 
2. Article III Court Coercion: Herein of Enforcement Courts. Hart 
saw no constitutionally mandated “essential role” for the inferior 
Article III courts. When, however, those courts were asked to enforce 
legislatively or administratively imposed duties or obligations with
respect to liberty or property, which Hart assumed would be the 
standard case, then they had to disregard any impairment of their 
“essential attributes,” in particular the “judicial duty to say what the
law is,” at least when deprivations of common law liberty or property
are at issue. He rejected judicial deference to administrative law 
formulation. For him, Article III courts must independently determine
the applicable rule of law on statutory (as well as constitutional) 
issues.26 Hart’s view finds much favor today, but for a majority of the 
present Court, it is not a constitutional imperative.
In an ordinary case, the court, with the assistance of jurors and 
special masters, decides all the issues in a case. Nonetheless, following
the entire Court in Crowell v. Benson, Hart agreed that in the context 
of reviewing administrative adjudication, Article III itself imposed no 
“internal” obligation on an enforcement court to engage in ordinary
fact finding. And following Brandeis, Hart thought that the same was 
true with respect to “constitutional” or “jurisdictional” facts, although
“external” limits derived from the Due Process and Suspension 
Clauses might impose such a duty. These issues remain unsettled today.
On the question of remedies, Hart assumed the need for 
26. Hart included here courts in the “position” of an enforcement court—courts where a
prospective defendant is the plaintiff. Hart believed (and I agree) that such courts should presume 
that the issues open to a defendant in an enforcement proceeding were also open in an advance
challenge. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1373–74 (“What you have to keep your eye on, when a 
plaintiff is attacking governmental action, is whether the action plays a part in establishing a duty
which later may be judicially enforced against him.”).

















   
      
 




     
   
 
 92019] JURISDICTION STRIPPING CIRCA 2020 
constitutionally adequate remedies. But he had nothing concrete to say
except that injunctions were “exceptional” and that access to habeas 
corpus probably could not be barred for federal detainees. Hart’s
passing glances at the issue of remedies have not withstood the passage 
of time. 
3. Extra-Judicial Coercion: Herein of Administrative Deprivations 
of Liberty or Property. The Dialogue was strongly animated by very
traditional concerns about an arbitrary, unchecked bureaucracy, 
particularly when it interfered with traditional liberty or property in a 
coercive manner through the imposition of duties or obligations.27 Hart
insisted that our conceptions of limited government require that some
court must be available when a person alleges an illegal (perhaps 
unconstitutional only?) administrative deprivation of liberty or 
property. His central focus, which occupies much of The Dialogue, was 
on the possibility of access to Article III court relief under general 
jurisdictional statutes (such as habeas corpus), despite apparent 
congressional restrictions on those statutes.28 Questions concerning the
scope of judicial review were left largely underdeveloped. 
* * * 
As will be seen, Article III has from the beginning been—and still 
is—read by many to dictate the conclusion that federal court subject-
matter jurisdiction, including that of the Supreme Court, rests entirely
in congressional hands. In significant measure, this is surely true. 
However, also in significant measure, it is an over-simplification.29 To 
begin with, even for ardent originalists, Article III’s original meaning 
27. LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320–94 (1965);
Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 17–19. 
28. Hart has nothing directly to say about governmental violations of other legal “rights,” 
unless they could be characterized as involving deprivations of liberty or property. E.g., Trinity 
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021–22 (2017) (invalidating 
discriminatory denial of benefits on the basis of religious status); see Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1109–15 (2010) [hereinafter Fallon,
Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered].
29. Simply as a matter of logic, for Congress to deny subject-matter jurisdiction to the Article 
III courts is one thing; it is quite another to confer it with “strings on it.” The Dialogue, supra note 
4, at 1372. Hart’s observation was not a novel one. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 468
(1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“It is one thing for Congress to withhold jurisdiction. It is
entirely another to confer it and direct that it be exercised in a manner inconsistent with
constitutional requirements or, what in some instances may be the same thing, without regard to
them.”).
MONAGHAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2019 3:03 PM      
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must be understood against the then-existing and important 
background understandings which do not support unlimited
congressional power.30 Moreover, for many (and certainly this author),
no such historically confined inquiry could conclude Article III’s 
present “meaning.” Like other constitutional provisions, Article III 
should now be understood in the light of our whole constitutional 
history—past and present.31 (On the latter claim: this position is 
advanced as a theory of constitutional, not statutory, interpretation.) 
As noted, this Article follows Hart’s three main conclusions 
outlined above. Except for slightly over one page specifically 
addressing the Supreme Court’s “essential function,” The Dialogue
focused upon the Article III courts generally. But that one-page 
discussion appears early in The Dialogue, and it is by far its best known
and most controversial aspect. Accordingly, in Part I, we start there.
Next, Part II looks at Article III enforcement courts, a focus that took 
center stage in The Dialogue. Part III then examines judicial control of
administrative deprivations of liberty and property, a topic whose
importance has only grown with the proliferation of the administrative 
state since Hart first wrote in 1953. Finally, I offer some brief 
concluding reflections. 
I. THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
A. Hart and the Court’s Essential Role 
The Supreme Court’s appellate review could be formulated in
very modest terms: “The interpretation of the laws is the proper and 
peculiar province of the courts.”32 On this account, judicial review in
30. Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 568–69 
(2007) [hereinafter Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches].
 31. Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1158–59. Like Professor
Fallon, I too would “rely openly on such considerations as consistency with judicial precedent and 
functional desirability.” Id. at 1048; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 727–39 (1988) [hereinafter Monaghan, Stare
Decisis]; Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 781–96 
(2010) [hereinafter Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism]. For me, “it is in fact easy to
discern . . . the alternative to originalism. . . . [It] is pluralism.” Jamal Greene, The Age of Scalia, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 144, 151 (2016). 
32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see 
also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).














        
 
   
 




        
   
   
   
    
      
  
   
 
 
    
  
 112019] JURISDICTION STRIPPING CIRCA 2020
the Supreme Court is seen as nothing more than error correction33— 
no different in kind from that of any appellate court’s “ordinary and
humble” duty to “say what the law is” when deciding cases or 
controversies properly before it.34 Of course, from the very beginning 
much larger ideas were in play. The Constitutional Convention, 
undoubtedly influenced by federalism concerns, emphasized that 
Supreme Court review was necessary to ensure the supremacy of 
federal law.35 This helps explain why § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
limited, but nonetheless made mandatory, the Court’s review over 
state-court denials of a claim of federal right.36 In Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee, Justice Story proffered a different rationale for judicial review:
the Court’s settlement and coordination function.37 In his mind, the
Court needed to review denials in order to provide clarity, consistency,
and uniformity to federal law.
Whether the Court can now effectively discharge either function 
is open to doubt. The inferior federal courts have long since assumed
the frontline burden of ensuring state compliance with federal law, and 
it is their rulings that the Court usually reviews.38 The Court’s capacity
to provide unity and coherence to the now-vast body of federal law is 
also surely limited.39 In any event, however, the central theoretical 
33. Needless to say, it is a rare case now that error correction alone will provide a basis for a 
grant of review.
34. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 138–39 (1893); see also Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 12 (quoting
Thayer, supra, at 138–39). 
35. See Alison L. LaCroix, On Being “Bound Thereby,” 27 CONST. COMMENT. 507, 508
(2011) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause, not congressional veto, would ensure the supremacy
of federal law); Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, supra note 31, at 748–53. 
36. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 79–80. Review was on a writ of error which,
in theory, reached only errors on the face of the record. And, of course, except for a brief flicker
of time, the federal courts had no general “arising under” jurisdiction until 1875. HART AND 
WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 296. 
37. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816). Hamilton, too, had
earlier claimed that the function of Supreme Court was “to unite and assimilate . . . the rules of
national decisions.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 556 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). Although criticized as lacking a firm historical foundation, see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing 
Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1618–26 (2008), the settlement rationale was reiterated in James 
v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685, 686 (2016) (per curiam) (citing Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 348).
For recent expression of such views by individual members of the Court, see Tejas N. Narechania,
Certiorari, Universality, and a Patent Puzzle, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1345, 1360–61 (2018). 
38. With some notable exceptions, the Court’s direct review over the state courts is in 
practice generally limited to federal issues that arise in state-court criminal proceedings.
39. Peter L. Strauss offers a defense of the Chevron doctrine along this point:
[I]t is helpful to view Chevron through the lens of the Supreme Court’s severely 
restricted capacity directly to enforce uniformity upon the courts of appeals in those 
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12 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
difficulty confronting both explanations is, of course, Article III’s
“Exceptions Clause,” which many believe gives Congress a 
freestanding power over what the Court can hear.40 
Rejecting such a view of the Exceptions Clause, Hart simply
announced—almost in the form of a ukase—that the Constitution did
not contemplate that Congress could “destroy the essential role of the 
Supreme Court in the constitutional plan.”41 The long and acrimonious 
history surrounding this issue, of which Hart was no doubt aware, was 
not adverted to in this pronouncement.42 Moreover, Hart’s 
fundamental claim was not framed in terms of concern about 
congressional manipulation, although that may have been an implicit 
premise. Rather, Hart advanced a straightforward “legal process”
argument: no sensible person would “read[] the Constitution as 
authorizing its own destruction.”43 
This is the crux of what The Dialogue has to say:
Q. The McCardle case says that the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is entirely within Congressional control. 
A. You read the McCardle case for all it might be worth rather than 
the least it has to be worth, don’t you?
* * *
courts’ review of agency decisionmaking. When national uniformity in the
administration of national statutes is called for, the national agencies responsible for
that administration can be expected to reach single readings of the statutes for which
they are responsible and to enforce those readings within their own framework. A
demonstrated failure to do so would itself be grounds for reversal on judicial review.
Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1987). 
But see Frost, supra note 37, at 1588–89 (suggesting that Chevron casts doubt on whether there is
a uniform meaning to be had). But the Court continues to reiterate its coordination function. See, 
e.g., James, 136 S. Ct. at 686.
40. Article III, § 2, clause 2 provides: 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all
the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, 
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; see also Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, 
at 1087–93. 
41. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1365. 
42. Chapter 4 of the first edition of the casebook did refer to the issue of state court 
resistance to Supreme Court mandates. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 418–19. 
43. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1365.
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A. You would treat the Constitution, then, as authorizing exceptions
which engulf the rule, even to the point of eliminating the appellate 
jurisdiction altogether? How preposterous!
* * *
A. It’s not impossible for me to lay down a measure. The measure is
simply that the exceptions must not be such as will destroy the 
essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan.
McCardle, you will remember, meets that test. . . . 
Q. The measure seems pretty indeterminate to me.
A. Ask yourself whether it is any more so than the tests which the 
Court has evolved to meet other hard situations. But whatever the
difficulties of the test, they are less, are they not, than the difficulties
of reading the Constitution as authorizing its own destruction?44 
I think Hart got it right. 
B. The Critical Responses and the Apparently Dominant View  
Hart’s claim met sharp and sustained challenge. His casebook co-
author, Herbert Wechsler, believed that all federal court subject-
matter jurisdiction rested entirely with Congress. Strongly reflecting 
the “ordinary and humble” “dispute resolution” model of 
constitutional adjudication,45 Wechsler wrote in his piece The Courts 
and the Constitution: 
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, do not pass on
constitutional questions because there is a special function vested in
them to enforce the Constitution or police the other agencies of
government. They do so rather for the reason that they must decide a
litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction and in doing
so must give effect to the supreme law of the land. That is, at least,
what Marbury v. Madison was all about. I have not heard that it has 
44. Id. at 1364–65 (footnotes omitted). 
45. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 73–77 (contrasting the dispute resolution of
adjudication with a law-declaration model). The dispute resolution model argues that courts, 
including the Supreme Court, declare law only to the extent necessary to resolve the cases before
them. Id. Courts have no special function to police or advise other organs of government. See
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1370
(1973) [hereinafter Monaghan, The Who and When]; Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding 
Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 669–78 (2012)
[hereinafter Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance]. 
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14 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
yet been superseded, though I confess I read opinions on occasion
that do not exactly make its doctrine clear.46 
Earlier in that article, Wechsler applied this analysis to the 
Exceptions Clause: 
There is, to be sure, a school of thought that argues that “exceptions”
has a narrow meaning, not including cases that have constitutional
dimension; or that the supremacy clause or the due process clause of
the fifth amendment would be violated by an alteration of the
jurisdiction motivated by hostility to the decisions of the Court. I see
no basis for this view and think it antithetical to the plan of the
Constitution for the courts . . . .47 
For Wechsler, the Exceptions Clause should not be read narrowly. 
Rather, it provided Congress with quite broad authority to regulate 
federal court subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Wechsler’s criticism of Hart found support in Charles Black’s 
rejection of the so-called counter-majoritarian objection to judicial 
review.48 That objection was misplaced, Black argued, because the 
Court’s appellate authority depends entirely upon popular consent, 
which is expressed in the acts of Congress governing the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.49 Indeed, Black insisted, congressional control is 
“the rock on which rests the legitimacy of the judicial work in a
46. Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1965)
[hereinafter Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution] (footnote omitted).
 47. Id. at 1005 (footnote omitted); see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1959).
48. This objection to judicial review is, of course, most famously associated with Alex Bickel. 
See  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–20, 65–72, 259–65 (1st ed.
1962); see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 259 (2009) (“The constant theme
of the Court’s prominent critics in the legal academy after 1957 was that majority will is frustrated
when unelected and unaccountable judges strike down legislative and executive acts.”).
49. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 846
(1975) [hereinafter Black, The Presidency]; see also PAUL M. BATOR , DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL 
J. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 382 n.29 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER, 3d Edition];
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW: THE 1979 HOLMES LECTURES 19, 37– 
39 (1981). Along a somewhat different plane, there is now a body of scholarship that argues that
the Court is in fact a significantly majoritarian institution, or is at least significantly limited by
what the majority will accept. For an endorsement of this school of thought, see Joseph Landau,
New Majoritarian Constitutionalism, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2018). See also David A.
Strauss, Fisher v. University of Texas and the Conservative Case for Affirmative Action, 2016 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 20–24 (arguing that the Court’s affirmative action cases in the education area rest on
such a foundation). 
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democracy.”50 And Gerry Gunther defended jurisdiction stripping as a
legitimate way to discipline the Court for “over-reaching” substantive 
decisions.51 Gunther viewed jurisdiction stripping as a useful balancing 
component in our system of separation of powers.52 
The “traditional”53 and “conventional”54 opinion is that neither 
Article III itself nor separation of powers more generally impose limits 
on the congressional power to fashion subject-matter limitations on the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. For that position, impressive academic 
support exists, including not only Wechsler, Black, and Gunther but 
also William Van Alstyne, Paul Bator, and Martin Redish.55 To that list
we must now add Tara Grove, and perhaps Aziz Huq.56 
And, I would add, that position certainly finds early historical 
support wholly apart from the assumptions underlying the numerous
jurisdiction-stripping proposals that have failed in Congress. First, of 
course, is the example of § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which 
confined Supreme Court review over state courts only to instances in 
which the federal claim had been denied; and (with a brief exception) 
there was no statutory general “arising under” jurisdiction until 1875. 
Second, until the end of the nineteenth century, the Court’s review of 
federal criminal convictions was only permissible upon a certificate of 
50. Black, The Presidency, supra note 49, at 846.
 51. Gunther, supra note 11, at 919–20. 
52. Id.
 53. See PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF, GILLIAN E. METZGER, DAVID J. BARRON &
ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND 
COMMENTS 1384 (12th ed. 2018). 
54. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the
Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 258 (2017). 
55. See Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 
VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1038 (1982); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme
Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 
27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 915 (1982); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 
15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 257–60, 269 (1973); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards
of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 875–78 (2011) [hereinafter Grove, Structural
Safeguards] (focusing on the Supreme Court but also noting commentators who denied plenary
congressional power).
56. Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 465, 517–38 (2018) (examining and explaining the lack of a political norm against jurisdiction
stripping); Aziz Z. Huq, The Constitutional Law of Agenda Control, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1401,
1435–36 (2016) (“[I]n the absence of a definitive statement to the contrary from the Court it would 
seem that the text of Article III . . . vests the legislature with tolerably broad authority to
determine which constitutional questions of national import end up on the judiciary’s agenda.”).
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16 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
division or upon an “original” writ of habeas corpus.57 Finally, there is
the Court’s early, little-noticed decision in United States v. More, where 
the Court dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Circuit Court for 
the District Court of Columbia for want of appellate subject-matter 
jurisdiction.58 By a 2–1 vote, the circuit court had held unconstitutional 
a congressional attempt to reduce the compensation of one of Mr.
Marbury’s fellow justices of the peace.59 In the Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Marshall, repeating themes he stressed in the oral argument, 
said that no statute authorized the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.60 
What strikes me most is how entirely unperturbed the Court seemed 
by the fact that it could not review a lower-court determination 
invalidating an act of Congress.61 
All said, a great many lawyers and political actors throughout our 
constitutional history have believed in the existence of an unfettered 
congressional power over the Court’s appellate subject-matter 
jurisdiction. For me, that history counts—and it counts against Hart 
(and me).62 
C. Textual and Other Ambiguities  
Now to the other side. First, let us clearly frame the issue. 
Subsequent to The Dialogue, scholars began to distinguish between
limits “internal” to Article III and separation of powers and limits
“external” thereto.63 On the “external” side, few (I suppose) would 
57. E.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (reviewing 
upon certificate of division); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 92 (1807) (reviewing upon
“original” writ of habeas corpus).
58. United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 168 (1805).
 59. Id. at 160 n.2.
 60. Id. at 173–74. 
61. Michael Collins and Ann Woolhandler argue that the Marshall Court—unlike the Taney
Court—faced a hostile political environment and thus was particularly reluctant to challenge
jurisdictional limitations. See Michael Collins & Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Federalism Under
Marshall and Taney, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 339–40 (2017). For an additional reference, see 
Professor Fallon’s discussion of Jefferson’s 1802 repeal of the short-lived Federalist legislation of
1801 in Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1073.
 62. See, e.g., Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 55, at 888–916. On the history of 
jurisdiction-stripping proposals directed at the Supreme Court, see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 
54, at 287–311, which provides a valuable historical account of this controversy, both before and
after Hart. On executive department resistance to jurisdiction stripping, see Tara Leigh Grove, 
The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 250, 268–86 (2012). 
63. The classic exposition of this distinction is by Gunther, supra note 11, at 900 (“[T]he
‘internal’ restraints are those arguably implied by article III itself; the ‘external’ ones are those 
inferable from other provisions of the Constitution.”).



















   
  
   








   




 172019] JURISDICTION STRIPPING CIRCA 2020
now dispute, for example, that many litigant-framed limits on an
Article III court’s jurisdiction (e.g., discriminating against black or 
Catholic litigants) are invalid and would be disregarded. The 
Dialogue’s distinction between limitations imposed by Article III itself
and those imposed by the Due Process and the Suspension Clauses
shows Hart’s awareness of the point.64 We can put that whole
discussion to the side, however. Subject-matter limitations on the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction is where the real controversy still lies. 
I disagree with Wechsler and company. Even from a strictly
originalist or textualist point of view, the “plain meaning” argument 
drawn from the Exceptions Clause is unpersuasive. In fact, the textual
argument is quite weak if one reads the clause in the context of the 
overall structure and relationships created by the Constitution.65 
Unlike the inferior federal courts, the Constitution itself establishes the 
Supreme Court, and it invests that Court with some mandatory share
of “the judicial power of the United States.”66 Moreover, in 1789, it was 
almost universally understood that the Court would review the validity 
of legislation.67 (The scope, not the existence, of judicial review was the
contested matter, as it remains to be now.) And finally, for what it is 
worth, Professor Birk notes that clauses creating “exceptions” to the
jurisdiction of the superior and supreme courts of England and 
Scotland did not reach matters of fundamental importance.68 
Given all of this, the Exceptions Clause, which as a textual matter 
seems to connote something of relatively minor importance, is a 
strikingly oblique way to endow legislators with the expansive 
64. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1365, 1373. 
65. The Court frequently reminds us to take the whole text into account in the statutory 
context. E.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 632 (2018) (“As this Court has
noted time and time again, the Court is ‘obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress 
used.’” (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979))).
 66. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2. I recognize that early decisions read the Exceptions Clause
to mean that Congress had denied subject-matter jurisdiction if it had not expressly conferred it.
See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 312 (1810). That reading seems to me
wrong, but it is now too late in the day to challenge.
 67. See, e.g., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 71–73.  
68. See Daniel D. Birk, The Common-Law Exceptions Clause: Congressional Control of
Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction in Light of British Precedent, 63 VILL. L. REV. 189, 196 
(2018). (“In addition, and more intriguingly, a robust and well-developed line of precedent in
British case law establishes that even statutes removing the power of King’s Bench or the Court 
of Session to exercise discretionary appellate review were always understood to leave intact the
jurisdiction of these supreme courts to correct jurisdictional excesses and obvious errors or denials
of due process by inferior courts and tribunals through the writs of prohibition, mandamus, and
habeas corpus (and their Scottish equivalents).”).
MONAGHAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2019 3:03 PM      
   
  
  












    




    
  
   
   
 
     
    
  
  
     
   
  
18 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
authority to eviscerate completely a central responsibility of another 
constitutionally ordained branch of government! On this point, I 
invoke James Madison: “An interpretation that destroys the very 
characteristic of the government cannot be just.”69 Hart’s interpretive 
philosophy sounds exactly like Madison!  
Other sources of support for congressional control over Article III 
courts are simply unable to bear the weight put on them, particularly 
the decisions at the end of the Civil War. The Ex parte McCardle
statement that the Court was “not at liberty to inquire into the motives 
of the legislature” regarding subject-matter restrictions occurred in the 
same opinion in which the Court also explicitly recognized that another 
avenue of review was available.70 That avenue was subsequently
invoked in Ex parte Yerger.71 Moreover, shortly after McCardle, United
States v. Klein invoked congressional purpose to invalidate a subject-
matter limitation on the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.72 As Professor
Nelson reminds us, “purpose” inquiries, while not common during this 
period, were available at least when an impermissible purpose seemed 
facially apparent, as was the case in Klein.73 Lastly, there is the
69. James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 480, 482 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999); cf. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. 
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994) (holding that the word “modify” in section 203 of 
the Communications Act could not be interpreted in a way that effected “basic and fundamental
changes” to the statutory scheme). One source of our present difficulty is Marbury itself, which 
concluded that the Court’s original jurisdiction could not be enlarged. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137, 175–76 (1803). While that view still has strong supporters, I am not among them.
An equally plausible construction would have been to say that the Exceptions Clause simply
permitted Congress to redistribute the Constitution’s original assignment of the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction with respect to any case that falls within Article III. Under that view, Congress could
not deprive the Court of any right to hear a denial of a federal claim—a result arguably most
consistent with the Madisonian Compromise, which established the Supreme Court but 
postponed any decision on whether there should be lower federal courts. Be that as it may, Ortiz
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018), makes plain that the Court now will not revisit that holding.
Id. at 2173; see also Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1089 n.215. 
70. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869). Specifically, the alternative avenue
existed in the form of original writs of habeas corpus. See id. (“The act of 1868 does not except
from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does not 
affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised.”). This rationale was to reappear in Felker
v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996), which stated: “No provision of [the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996] mentions our authority to entertain original habeas petitions . . . .” Id. 
at 660. 
71. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 104–06 (1869) (affirming the Court’s jurisdiction 
to issue a writ of habeas corpus under the Judiciary Act of 1789, notwithstanding the repealing 
legislation of 1868).
72. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145–46 (1872).
 73. Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1790 
(2008) [hereinafter Nelson, Judicial Review].
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troublesome question of how much weight should be given to the 
various opinions written during the turbulence of the Civil War era. To 
borrow Richard Fallon’s felicitous language, I believe that arguments 
from those sources need to be “decentered.”74 
At this point, attention must turn to a troubling footnote in the 
2017 Term’s decision in Patchak v. Zinke (“Patchak II”).75 David 
Patchak challenged the Interior Secretary’s authority to invoke the
Indian Reorganization Act in taking into trust certain property 
(“Bradley Property”) on which an Indian tribe wished to build a 
casino.76 In the first iteration of Patchak (“Patchak I”), the Court 
sustained Patchak’s right to sue, and it also held that the suit was not 
barred by sovereign immunity.77 While the litigation was pending on 
remand, Congress enacted legislation that “reaffirmed [the Bradley 
Property] as trust land.”78 Of importance here is § 2(b) of that
legislation, which provided that “an action . . . relating to [that] land . . 
. shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be 
promptly dismissed.”79 
In Patchak II, a divided Court affirmed dismissal of the suit.80 
Interestingly, every member of the Court focused only on § 2(b).81 A 
four-Justice plurality, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, read § 2(b) as
jurisdiction stripping and held that it was valid because it simply
changed the substantive statutory law applicable in the case.82 
74. Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1048. I do not deny, 
however, that our history provides support for jurisdiction stripping focused on the Supreme 
Court. But history is seldom plain vanilla. And our history, taken as a whole over time, does not
provide solid and incontrovertible support for jurisdiction stripping, and the line of development
of our legal traditions runs against it. Of course, hypothetically, Congress could completely
“destroy” the Supreme Court if it wished. It could, for example, decide to fund only the Justices’
salary. But, in those circumstances, the whole constitutional order will have broken down, and
constitutional law will be completely irrelevant. We get little help in focusing on such a scenario.
75. Patchak v. Zinke (Patchak II), 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
 76. Id. at 903.
 77. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak (Patchak I), 567 
U.S. 209, 212 (2012).
78. Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation (Gun Lake) Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, § 2(a), 128
Stat. 1913, 1913 (2014). 
79. Id. § 2(b). 
80. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 910; see The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—Leading Cases, 132
HARV. L. REV. 277, 297 (2018) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
81. I myself would have read § 2(b) as surplusage and would have treated § 2(a) as having 
worked the relevant change in the law.
 82. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 905–06 (plurality opinion). Justice Breyer joined the plurality 
but also wrote separately. Id. at 911–12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
MONAGHAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2019 3:03 PM      
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Concurring opinions by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor understood 
§ 2(b) as simply restoring the bar of sovereign immunity.83 
While one should resist overreading Patchak II, Justice Thomas
authored two tantalizing footnotes, and until we are instructed
otherwise, judges, lawyers, and academics cannot dismiss them as 
unimportant dicta.84 In footnote three, Justice Thomas indicated that 
jurisdiction stripping is simply a method for changing the applicable 
statutory law whenever Congress has the constitutional power to do 
so.85 But in footnote four, Justice Thomas articulated a much broader 
rationale for jurisdiction stripping.86 He maintained that United States 
v. Klein had effectively modified any anti-jurisdiction-stripping
implications of Ex parte McCardle, indirectly and erroneously citing 
Hart and Wechsler in support.87 Justice Thomas then went on to
characterize the discussion of Ex parte Yerger as involving concern 
over limitations on habeas corpus rather than concerns about Article
III.88 That point clearly has merit,89 but it ignores both the historically 
tight nexus between habeas and the courts,90 as well as the implications 
of Felker v. Turpin.91 Moreover, it entirely ignores the complex role of 
83. Id. at 912–13 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 913–14 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring in the judgment).
 84. See Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 2
(1979). 
85. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 906 n.3 (plurality opinion). Justice Breyer’s separate opinion
agreed on that point. Id. at 911–12 (Breyer, J., concurring). This, of course, clearly suggests that
jurisdiction stripping is inapplicable when constitutional provisions are involved.
 86. Id. at 907 n.4 (plurality opinion).
 87. Id. (quoting Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1324 (2016) (quoting HART AND 
WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 324)). The HART AND WECHSLER citation is to a different point: a
statement in Klein that Congress can’t prescribe applicable rules in pending cases—a legislative 
competence that, as Hart and Wechsler note, has often been recognized.
 88. Id.
 89. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 102–03 (1868) (discussing the consequences of 
limiting appellate jurisdiction over habeas cases).
 90. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 907 n.4. 
91. Compare Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 103, with Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 654 (1996)
(construing a statute so as not to bar review of constitutional claims in the habeas context). See
Daniel J. Meltzer, The Story of Ex parte McCardle: The Power of Congress to Limit the Supreme
Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 57, 77 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith
Resnik eds., 2010); see also Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s
Authority to Shape the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES, supra, at 
108–13. An essay by Mark Tushnet also contains an illuminating discussion of Crowell v. Benson. 
Mark Tushnet, The Story of Crowell: Grounding the Administrative State, in FEDERAL COURTS
STORIES, supra, at 359. I discuss this topic in more detail below. See infra text accompanying notes
210–12. 
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purpose analysis in constitutional adjudication during that period,92 as 
well as the extent to which the Civil War precedents should hold
influence in our time. Interestingly, Justice Thomas’s most provocative 
point in footnote four is very close to Hart: Article III is empty unless
Article III court jurisdiction is invoked.93 While Justice Breyer joined 
the plurality, he clearly is not of that view, nor is Justice Sotomayor or 
the dissent.94 
In the end, I think the Court will not consider Patchak II to have
authoritatively resolved a fundamental constitutional issue in a less-
than-pellucid footnote in a plurality opinion relying upon difficult Civil 
War precedents. Since, for me, neither text nor long-standing authority 
decisively resolves the jurisdiction-stripping issue, I turn to our whole
constitutional history, past and present, to inform an appropriate,
current understanding of separation of powers. Article III’s reference
to the “judicial power” and one “supreme Court” should be 
understood as placeholders for inferences drawn from the overall 
structure and relationships created by the original Constitution and
from the evolution of those conceptions over time. 
D. The Supreme Court, Limited Government, and the Rule of Law  
The authoritative status of our written Constitution has never
been in doubt.95 But the Justices of the Supreme Court did not assume
92. See Nelson, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 1790. 
93. Patchak II, 138 S. Ct. at 907 n.4 (plurality opinion). Perhaps Justice Thomas meant to
confine this point to non-constitutional cases. Interestingly, Justice Thomas makes no mention of
his plurality opinion in Oil States or his concurrence in Ortiz. Id.
 94. Id. at 911–12 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 913–14 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the 
judgment); see also Leading Cases, supra note 80, at 305–06. 
95. This is something I have written about at length before:
One can acknowledge not only that the idea of a written constitution is unclear (case-
law rules are also written), but also that in theory it would seem to be a meaningless
circumstance. Nonetheless, history asserts a powerful claim here, and in that light the 
written quality of the Constitution counted a great deal. The American Constitution
was a watershed in the evolution of thinking about the meaning of a constitution: it
culminated a shift from viewing a constitution as simply a description of the 
fundamental political arrangements of the society to a conception that the constitution
stood behind, or grounded and legitimated, those arrangements—and of course
constrained them. In this development, the “writtenness” of the American Constitution
was crucial. . . . And of course Marbury v. Madison itself placed considerable emphasis
upon the written nature of the Constitution, stating that the Constitution must be
enforced by the courts, otherwise the result would “reduce to nothing what we have
deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions—a written constitution.” 
Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 31, at 769 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803)).
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22 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
an unchallengeable final interpretive role until after the Civil War.96 
(And this is Hart’s starting point.) In the antebellum era, most of the 
great constitutional debates occurred in Congress, especially in the 
Senate. After the war, however, the Justices emerged as the 
Constitution’s priestly custodians. And, in achieving that status, they 
have now fashioned a thick and imposing doctrinal corpus.97 The long 
drive towards both enlarging and giving the Court control over its own
docket confirms the Court’s unique status in our constitutional polity.
That has been clear for at least a century. Speaking of the 1925 “Judges’
Bill,”98 for example, Frankfurter and Landis long ago wrote: 
At the heart of the proposal was the conservation of the Supreme 
Court as the arbiter of legal issues of national significance. But this
object could hardly be attained so long as there persisted the obstinate
conception that the Court was to be the vindicator of all federal rights.
This conception the Judges’ Bill completely overrode. Litigation
which did not represent a wide public interest was left to state courts of 
last resort and to the circuit courts of appeals, always reserving to the 
Supreme Court power to determine that some national interest justified 
invoking its jurisdiction.99 
For me, the Court’s “essential role” finds its deep roots in
Marbury v. Madison’s emphasis on limited government and rule-of-law 
principles.100 “Marbury’s repeated emphasis that a written constitution 
imposes limits on every organ of government . . . . welded judicial 
96. In a recent article, Professor Fallon makes substantially the same point about the Court’s
interpretive role. Although, with his customary modesty, he advances it in a less categorical
manner. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule
of Law in a Populist Age, 96 TEX. L. REV. 487 (2018). 
97. Henry P. Monaghan, The Constitution of the United States and American Constitutional
Law, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER OLD CONSTITUTIONS 175 (Eivind Smith ed., 1995), 
reprinted in HENRY PAUL MONAGHAN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 613 (2018). 
98. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
28 U.S.C.).
 99. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 260–61 (1927) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted);
see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State
Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1962–63 (2003). For other expressions of 
this point of view, see HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 572; William H. Rehnquist, The 
Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1986). Unsurprisingly, the 
Court’s ability to reshape norms is most effective when it or the lower courts can directly 
implement the Court’s holdings. See generally MATTHEW E.K. HALL, THE NATURE OF SUPREME
COURT POWER (2011) (identifying the circumstances under which the Court has been successful
at altering the conduct of both private and public actors). 
100. Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 32.
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review to the political axiom of limited government.”101 That emphasis 
was no accident. “Limited government,” then particularly a fear of
legislative (not administrative) abuse, “was the common bond uniting 
political discussion about the meaning of such diverse concepts as a 
written constitution, fundamental law, social contract, separation of
powers, and federalism.”102 Following the tradition exemplified by 
Hart, his colleague Louis Jaffe, and many others, I understand limited 
government not as freedom from legislation and regulation, but rather
in terms of checking our vast (and necessary) bureaucracy.103 Our belief
in the rule of law means that individuals and corporations may be 
subject only to properly enacted and authorized regulatory limits on 
their constitutionally protected liberty and property, as these rights are 
now understood! 
Earlier, I had posited—contrary to Wechsler—that Article III
courts had a “special function” to implement the axioms of limited
government.104 Perhaps the matter is more complex as to the inferior 
federal courts. But not as to the Supreme Court. This is a Court 
established by the Constitution itself, and the line of our constitutional 
development—to be sure messy, sharply contested, and by no means 
always one directionally forward—makes clear that the Court has now
emerged as a tribunal different in kind from all others. In our current 
separation of powers framework, the Court has a unique and essential 
role in maintaining the idea of the limited government contemplated 
by the written 1789 Constitution. Hart believed that the Constitution
itself instantiated some such conception. Perhaps; perhaps not. But 
history, if not original understanding, has vindicated Hart, not 
Wechsler. This country has long since understood that it needs a 
supreme constitutional court. For me, the ultimately prevailing line of 
development in our constitutional history has crucial, normative 
101. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–77 (1803) (footnote omitted));
id. at 32 n.187 (“At the end of the nineteenth century, judicial emphasis on enforcing 
constitutional limits to achieve limited government was commonplace.”); see also David Singh
Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism, 127 YALE L.J. 664, 677–78 
(2018) (book review) (emphasizing the important connection between the Constitution and
popular sovereignty in eighteenth-century political thought); Monaghan, The Who and When, 
supra note 45, at 1370. 
102. Monaghan, The Who and When, supra note 45, at 1371 n.47. 
103. See generally, e.g., JAFFE, supra note 27 (exploring the relationship between 
administrative agencies and the courts).
 104. Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 32–33. 
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24 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
significance.105 The historical tradition I invoke is, of course, not the 
plain-vanilla, unbroken line so favored by the Court.106 Far from it. The
evolving tradition upon which I draw has from the beginning been a 
contested one, with its very foundational premises open to challenge 
and reformulation.107 But in my view, it is nonetheless a valid source to
be considered in the formulation of constitutional doctrine.108 
The Court itself, I would add, quite understands its own
importance in our constitutional order. It is, shall we say, “reluctant”
105. I fully recognize that history is often messy and, in any event, not self-interpreting.
Moreover, “history,” however ascertained, can normatively bear only so much controlling 
authority as we think appropriate to accord it. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA.
L. REV. 659, 662–68 (1987). The appropriate role for nonjudicial sources in interpreting the
meaning of a constitutional provision is the subject of debate—a topic recently explored in
William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019). But my focus is not on a 
specific clause but on the current understanding of the essential role of one of the three national 
institutions created by the Constitution. The public frenzy over Supreme Court nominations from
Judge Bork to Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh reflect the fact that, to a degree not characteristic
of the past, the public is aware of the unique importance of the Court in our political and
constitutional order. E.g., Mark Landler & Maggie Haberman, Former Bush Aide is Trump Pick
for Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2018, at A1 (describing President Trump’s nomination of Justice
Kavanaugh).
106. The role of history in constitutional interpretation was most recently on display in
Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2567 (2019) (“Here, as in other areas, our
interpretation of the Constitution is guided by a Government practice that “has been open,
widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic.” (quoting NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 572 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment))). 
107. Justice Holmes elaborated on that line of development in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920):
[W]hen we are dealing with words [in] the Constitution of the United States, we must
realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have
been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has
cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The 
case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely
in that of what was said a hundred years ago.
Id. at 433.
108. Jeff Powell articulates this point aptly:
Intellectual traditions differ in the way they cohere over time. As the great philosopher
Alasdair MacIntyre said years ago, a tradition of rational inquiry does not maintain its
continuity through the simple repetition of what has been thought and said in the past.
What gives life to such a tradition is not so much agreement about answers as it is
agreement about questions. In MacIntyre’s words, an intellectual ‘tradition is an
argument extended through time in which [even its] fundamental agreements are
defined and redefined . . . [through] conflict.’ An intellectual tradition, unless it goes
dead, is a continuity of conflict, and debate and disagreement are its lifeblood. The
emergence of the American constitutional law tradition, then, is the story of an ongoing
debate, an endless argument over, among other things, what constitutional law is about.
H. Jefferson Powell, The Emergence of the American Constitutional Law Tradition, 103 
JUDICATURE, no. 1, Spring 2019, at 24, 25 (quoting ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?
WHICH RATIONALITY? 12 (1988)) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).














       
  
 
    
  





     
 
   
  
   
     
   
   
 252019] JURISDICTION STRIPPING CIRCA 2020
to read any statute as shutting off its authority to review constitutional 
issues.109 And it now displays an avid propensity to assume that if any 
other court gets to decide a federal issue, it should have the last word
on the matter.110 Contrary to Wechsler’s belief in a uniform case-or-
controversy jurisprudence applicable to all Article III courts, the 
Supreme Court now aggressively displays a broad and unique array of 
“agenda control” devices, which exist wholly apart from the highly
important and now largely discretionary decision whether or not to 
grant review. These devices are employed in making limited grants of 
certiorari, reformulating the questions presented, injecting new 
questions into cases, invoking forfeiture rules, appointing amici to
defend positions abandoned by litigants, and strategically accepting or 
rejecting party stipulations, waivers, or concessions.111 Law declaration 
(or its avoidance), not dispute resolution, is the Court’s current 
hallmark.112 
Of course, both heuristic “models” are reflected in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. The pull of the older, Wechslerian dispute-resolution 
109. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366–67 (1974) (holding that 38 U.S.C. § 211
(2018), which prohibited judicial review of the decisions of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs
concerning veterans’ benefits, does not bar federal courts from considering constitutional claims);
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001) (concluding that habeas-corpus jurisdiction was not 
repealed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 or the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996)
(holding that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 “does not preclude this
Court from entertaining an application for habeas corpus relief”); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,
603 (1988) (reading the National Security Act of 1947 to apply only to statutory, not
constitutional, claims so as “to avoid the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a 
federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim”
(quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 677, 681 n.12 (1986))). For a more 
recent example, see Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018), where all nine members of a divided
Court seemed to agree to sustaining review of an appeal of an order by a three-judge court in the 
Western District of Texas directing Texas not to conduct elections using certain congressional
districting plans. Id. at 2319–21. What advocate would now like to argue to the Court that “Oh
yes, the statute does raise a major constitutional issue affecting liberty (and/or property), but
Congress does not want you to hear that issue?” 
110. See Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, supra note 45, at 683–89 (arguing that the Court
seeks to play a superintendent role over courts deciding issues of federal law). 
111. See id. at 689–707 (observing these practices). For another recent example, see Lucia v.
SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), where the Court appointed an amicus to defend a judgment that one 
of the original litigants—the United States government—would not defend. Id. at 2050–51. 
112. Illustrative of the Court’s ability to address only what it wants to address are Azar v. 
Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018), Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), and Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018), all decided on the same
day. One should also see Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019), where Justice Alito sharply
charged the Court with deciding an issue not fairly presented in the grant of certiorari. Id. at 731– 
32 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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jurisprudence still remains, and many decisions perhaps could still be 
fairly described within that framework. But, for many other cases, such
a descriptive model would surely offer an impoverished account. And
while the legacy of the dispute resolution model also insists upon case-
or-controversy constraints, such as standing and mootness, these 
constraints are now of a rather diluted nature because of the pressures 
exerted by the law-declaration model.113 But a perhaps insufficiently
appreciated feature of the older conception of the judicial office is that
it imposes an additional and important restraint: bounded rationality. 
Judicial lawmaking proceeds when uncertainty often exists as to the
consequences of a ruling, hence the considerable utility of 
knowledgeable amici briefs. Wechsler’s common-law-infused 
methodology thus underpins the strong judicial impulse to say no more 
than is necessary to dispose of the issue before the court. That 
constraint applies to the Supreme Court with special force, given the 
important and difficult issues that the Court constantly faces. More 
accurately stated then, law declaration, constrained by bounded 
rationality and other pragmatic considerations, is the Court’s current 
hallmark. 
The underlying controversy concerning congressional power 
remains a contested one.114 Perhaps we should acquiesce in the
“dominant” view, observing that strong political, institutional, and 
cultural “protections” safeguard maintenance of the Court’s “essential 
role.”115 These arguments have real force. But if now confronted on
grounds of first principle, I am of a different opinion. 
113. For a highly visible recent example, which I do not pursue here, see Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2415–16 (2018) (declining to decide the plaintiffs’ primary standing argument that
the Presidential Proclamation imposing entry restrictions on aliens from certain countries created
a dignitary injury and instead finding standing in a more concrete injury).
114. According to Bradley and Siegel’s recent uncovering of a fascinating exchange in the
U.S. Department of Justice over jurisdiction stripping, Ted Olson defended Hart while John
Roberts defended the Wechsler model. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 54, at 302–11. I should
add that I can think of no member of the Court since Hughes more committed to protecting the 
institutional independence of the Court against congressional interference than Chief Justice
Roberts. See, e.g., Patchak v. Zinke (Patchak II), 138 S. Ct. 897, 914 (2018) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (refusing to “cede unqualified authority to the Legislature to decide the outcome of
[a single pending] case” because “Article III of the Constitution vests that responsibility in the
Judiciary alone”); Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1332 (2016) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (lamenting “unconstitutional interference with the judicial function, whereby
Congress assumes the role of judge and decides a particular pending case in the first instance”). 
115. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 929, 948–78 (2013) (observing these protections throughout American history). See
generally Tara Leigh Grove, Article III in the Political Branches, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1835 
(2015) (arguing that this security against jurisdiction stripping rests entirely on a “convention,”
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E. Purpose and Jurisdiction-Stripping 
My (and Hart’s) viewpoint requires the resolution of a 
fundamental question: What is the Supreme Court’s “essential role”?
Fleshing out the Court’s “essential role” at first blush seems a difficult 
and controversial matter. And it is.116 For me, the relevant factors 
include intuitions on the Court’s role in maintaining the constitutional 
vision of a limited and stable government; on a belief that some legal 
decisions simply require final determination by a “supreme” court;117 
and the need to maintain a strong government, one capable of
restraining governmental abuses by both the national government and 
the states. 
Underlying these intuitions is a simple idea: necessity. Our current 
constitutional order requires a functioning, fully effective Supreme
Court. Operationalizing that belief, however, invites contest. Am I 
prepared to say that no “Exceptions” are valid, particularly given the 
long history to the contrary? No. What, then, is the standard? Any 
proposed standard is likely to wind up with difficulties. So be it. 
Perfection is not to be attained, but we must proceed as best we can. 
One could (arbitrarily? contestably?) refine Hart’s “essential 
role” theory along various substantive stopping points.118 For example,
but unlike enlarging the membership of the Court or disobeying Court orders, the convention
does not have the security of an unassailable constitutional “canon”). Moreover, jurisdiction
stripping may generate unbearable systemic costs, as Herbert Wechsler long ago pointed out,
which of course serves as a powerful deterrent to such action. Wechsler, The Courts and the
Constitution, supra note 46, at 1006–07. 
116. Hart himself recognized the difficulties. In response to Hart laying out his “essential
role” standard, his hypothetical sparring partner in The Dialogue retorted: “The measure seems
pretty indeterminate to me.” The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1365. 
117. For a potential contemporary counterexample of my second claim, see generally Emily
Buss, The Divisive Supreme Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 25, which decries Supreme Court
intervention in the same sex marriage dispute and contends that the matter was being ably
handled by the lower federal courts, who are more responsive to state and local sentiments. The 
Court, in fact, understood that and repeatedly denied review when the marriage claims were
sustained. It granted certiorari only after the Sixth Circuit created a circuit split. I think Professor
Buss’s discussion on that point is unconvincing because it included overturning an important prior
merits holding by the Court. See id. at 73–75. But her main point concerning “bottoms-up” 
lawmaking is well taken. See generally DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF
CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016) (arguing that many changes in the
law are instituted by the citizenry rather than the judiciary). Still, as time passes, I believe that the
“lawful” character of gay marriage will be seen to have been greatly enhanced because it had the 
imprimatur of the Supreme Court. 
118. The most prominent of such efforts were by Professor Ratner. See Leonard G. Ratner, 
Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 
157, 161 (1960) (arguing that the Court must be able to maintain the supremacy and uniformity
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28 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
perhaps the Court cannot be shut out from review of decisions denying
a claim of constitutional right by a private litigant,119 from adjudicating
questions of structure and relationship, or from a general supervisory
or ultra vires superintendency of the conduct of the inferior federal
courts.120 One might also argue that “Our Federalism”121 requires that
the Court possess at least the jurisdiction conferred by § 25 of the 1789
Judiciary Act, which allowed review of state-court action denying 
federal claims.122 Many pages of a very long article examining each of
these stopping points and their variations can be imagined. For me,
none would sufficiently protect the core constitutional values of limited 
and stable government. 
I am inclined to move along a different front, persuaded by 
Richard Fallon that:
[N]otwithstanding contrary language in the 1869 case of Ex parte
McCardle, Congress’s purpose or motive in enacting jurisdiction-
stripping legislation may sometimes bear crucially on such
legislation’s constitutionality.123 
of a federal law); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional
Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929, 935 (1982) (“The purposes of judicial
review cannot be effectively implemented without uniformity as well as supremacy of federal
law.”); see also Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 55, at 877–78 (collecting sources opposing 
restrictions on the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction).
119. The petitioner advanced a form of this argument in Felker v. Turpin. See Brief for 
Petitioner at 26, Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (No. 95-8836), 1996 WL 272389. 
120. See, e.g., James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1685 (2011) (restating Professor Pfander’s earlier claim that the Supreme 
Court must be able to supervise the inferior federal courts). For further discussion of Professor
Pfander’s views, and for an argument that Felker v. Turpin provides some support for Professor
Pfander’s argument, see Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1089–93. 
121. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
122. Alison LaCroix advances such an argument. See LaCroix, supra note 35, at 511; see also
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court: Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law School
Association of New York on February 15, 1913, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295–96 (1920)
(“I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act 
of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration
as to the laws of the several States.”). For an interesting discussion of Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433 (1939), along this line, see Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question
Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1944–46 (2015). 
123. Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1133 (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted). Fallon advances this principle as applicable in all subject-matter jurisdiction
cases. Perhaps I misread him, but I would not agree with Professor Fallon’s belief that the 
constitutionality of statutes stripping the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction may turn on 
whether other federal courts are open. See id. at 1087–93, particularly 1089. 
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At least with respect to constitutional claims, Professor Fallon 
states a minimum baseline.124 For anyone brought up in the Legal 
Process School, purpose inquiries constitute an important ingredient of 
adjudication, the importance of which may vary with the context.125 
(Three decisions of the Court in the 2017 Term decided on the same
day make that vividly clear!)126 Accordingly, I submit that our current
(and historical?) understanding of separation of powers should be
understood to mean that the Court—a coordinate branch of the 
national government—will excise subject-matter limitations on its
appellate jurisdiction when a substantial, undefended purpose of such
jurisdiction-stripping legislation is to limit the Court’s ability to 
consider a properly preserved constitutional claim.127 
124. With respect to statutory claims, it is possible to characterize jurisdiction stripping as the
equivalent of a change in the applicable substantive law and thus subject to those principles that
govern retroactive changes in the applicable law. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 355.
See generally Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018)
(considering an issue of jurisdiction stripping with respect to revocation of a patent under the 
Patent Act). 
125. HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1374–80. The role of legislative purpose and motive
inquiries in constitutional adjudication has varied over time. Professor Nelson notes the early 
reluctance of courts to go behind the legislatively declared purpose, and the significant decline of
that approach over the now last fifty years. See generally Nelson, Judicial Review, supra note 73
(providing a comprehensive account); see also Douglas Laycock, Churches, Playgrounds, 
Government Dollars—And Schools?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 133, 166–68 (2017) (observing the 
process through which courts find facially neutral laws discriminatory if they were enacted with a
bad legislative motive). For a recent examination of the complexities of motive or purpose
analysis—albeit mainly in the non-constitutional context—see generally Andrew Verstein, The 
Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106 (2018). The author seeks to navigate among
concepts such as motive, intent, and purpose. See id. at 1122. Professor Verstein focuses upon
mixed motive cases—cases on which the governmental conduct is premised on both permissible
and impermissible motives. As to motive, the author lists four major categories: primary, but-for,
sole, and any. Id. at 1134–43; see also Andrew Verstein, The Failure of Mixed Motive
Jurisprudence, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 725, 728 (2019) (discussing the difficulties of the “but-for”
standard). 
126. See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324–26 (2018) (addressing the burden of proof
governing an allegation of discriminatory legislative intent motivating the enactment of a state
redistricting plan); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1729–31 (2018) (discussing the respondent’s discriminatory motive in ruling against the petitioner
earlier in the case). And, in particular, there has been a spate of writing on the role of purpose in
constitutional adjudication after Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). See generally, e.g., 
Joseph Landau, Process Scrutiny: Motivational Inquiry and Constitutional Rights, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (analyzing the issue and collecting other sources). 
127. This reminds me of Equal Protection Clause cases, where purpose analysis plays a
significant role. See, e.g., Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2313 (referencing the “taint” of discriminatory
intent). Excising limits on its subject-matter jurisdiction allows the Court to discharge its role as
an equal branch of the government.
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This means that the jurisdiction-stripping restriction itself may 
prove to be valid. For example, consider the limited review in state-
prisoner habeas cases.128 But the judicial inquiry would ordinarily 
trigger scrutiny.129 And the Court cannot be foreclosed from 
considering the validity of the restrictions. Moreover, I submit, a
“naked” or even a substantial congressional purpose to bar the Court 
from considering constitutional challenges should not be sustained.130 
Suppose that Congress were to enact legislation that would restrict 
the right to an abortion beyond what the Constitution would presently 
allow. On the next day, it enacts legislation depriving only the Supreme
Court—a constitutionally created, coordinate branch of the national 
government—of subject-matter jurisdiction over any abortion related
matters.131 How should the present Court react? Should it not excise
the restriction on subject-matter jurisdiction, just as it did in 
Boumediene with respect to the district court’s habeas corpus
authority? For me, the answer is clearly yes.132 Hart’s position is vastly 
more consonant with contemporary understandings of separation of
powers than Wechsler’s.133 And, as Holmes put it, “the present has a
right to govern itself so far as it can.”134 
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2018). Indeed, it may be that Congress could bar any federal collateral
attack on a state prisoner’s conviction. See also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2408–09 (applying
limited motive review of alleged impermissible presidential motives).
 129. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2409 (applying limited motive review based on 
the “assum[ption] that some form of review is appropriate”); Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping
Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1134 (“In any event, scrutiny of legislative motivation is now the 
norm, not an anomaly, in constitutional law.”). The key issue is the scope of the judicial inquiry. 
130. I should stop here. But, drawing on our history, one could go further and add “or effect”
to “purpose.” I have not thought that out. My intuition is that purpose-based limitations on
Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping authority should be reasonably effective in vindicating the 
Court’s essential role in our system of separation of powers. Indeed, it may in fact amount to a 
new per se rule. 
131. Arguably, there is no congressional “aggrandizement” of judicial decision-making
authority because other courts remain open.
132. Another view—one which runs somewhat against the grain of the case law—would be to
stress that the appellate jurisdiction is conferred by Article III itself, and it cannot be subject to
unconstitutional regulation under the Exceptions Clause. Still another view would emphasize that
no “inferior” court can be superior to the Supreme Court.
133. I use “legitimation” in a loose sociological or legal sense. See generally Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005) (describing various theories
of legitimacy). Professor Fallon has further developed his analysis in his new book, RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT (2018), reviewed in a book essay 
by Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240 (2019). 
134. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Learning and Science, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard
Law School Association in Honor of Professor C.C. Langdell, June 25, 1895, in COLLECTED
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F. The Hatter 
An essential-function position is surely open to challenge, and by 
no means would it be implausible to argue for the position held by
Wechsler and company. Perhaps, therefore, we should take particular 
comfort in the fact that, for more than two centuries, we have muddled 
along without definitively resolving this highly charged constitutional 
issue. 
Consider, in this regard, the relevance (if any) of the exchange 
between Alice and the Mad Hatter:  
“Have you guessed the riddle yet?” the Hatter said, turning to Alice 
again.
“No, I give it up,” Alice replied: “what’s the answer?”
“I haven’t the slightest idea,” said the Hatter.135 
Having no definitive resolution to some of our own constitutional
riddles may itself be a success story. I have long believed that our polity
should not confront and resolve too many matters of first principle.136 
But, should the necessity arise, the time has long passed when the 
Supreme Court can be sensibly understood as simply an institution that 
humbly and necessarily declares law only as an incident to resolving a 
dispute. 
II. ARTICLE III AND ENFORCEMENT COURTS
While Hart’s essential-functions thesis regarding the Supreme
Court is The Dialogue’s most well-known component, it occupies a 
mere two pages in his forty-two-page article. Hart spent much more
time discussing Article III courts in general. Of particular concern to
LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 122, at 138–39. Holmes’s specific reference was to legislation, but I
would apply it to all the units of government.
 135. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 100–01 (Macmillan & Co.
1867).
136. David Strauss recognized the difficulty in striking a balance between ambiguity and
specificity in the Constitution:
It takes a certain kind of genius to construct a document that uses language specific
enough to resolve some potential controversies entirely and to narrow the range of
disagreement on others—but that also uses language general enough not to force on a
society outcomes that are so unacceptable that they discredit the document. The genius
of the U.S. Constitution is precisely that it is specific where specificity is valuable and
general where generality is valuable—and it does not put us in unacceptable situations
that we can’t plausibly interpret our way out of. There is reason to think that the
framers were self-conscious about this.
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 71–72 (2010).
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Hart was when lower federal courts operated as “enforcement courts”
employed to implement government policy. It is to these problems we
now turn. 
A. The Possibility of Judicial Control 
While Hart saw no constitutionally mandated “essential function” 
for the inferior Article III courts, he was fully aware of the reality of 
their importance—a reality which time has greatly intensified. These 
courts have now assumed enormous legal, political, and cultural 
significance.137 They are the front line in enforcing federal law, and are
now a part of our “common intellectual heritage.”138 Indeed, their 
existence is now widely perceived to be a necessary ingredient of a 
legitimate constitutional order.139 
Rather than explore these broad aspects of our constitutional 
polity, The Dialogue’s focus was much more limited: the constitutional
status of the inferior Article III courts. Although significantly resisting 
such a conclusion in actual practice, Hart believed that Congress 
(perhaps habeas aside) was constitutionally free to bypass these
tribunals.140 But if they were employed to enforce governmental policy, 
whether determined legislatively or administratively (the usual
situation, he assumed), Article III itself mandates judicial inquiry into 
the validity of any legislative restriction on their authority.141 If the
137. In a penetrating book review (ostensibly of the third edition of the casebook but actually
of the first edition), Professor Amar argued that the casebook’s “hands off the states” theme had
been eviscerated only a year later by Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Amar, supra note 2, at 702–06. 
138. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Judiciary’s Bicentennial, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 427 (1989); see 
also Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State Courts in
Our Federal System, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1831, 1847–52 (2016) (discussing Meltzer’s article); 
cf. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1397 (remarking on the practical need of the federal government
for courts to vindicate its policies).
 139. Cf. Buss, supra note 117, at 44–45 (observing that the inferior Article III judges are closer
to the people of the several states than are the members of the Supreme Court). All that said, the
fact remains that we have no clear idea about their indispensable legal role. Monaghan, On 
Avoiding Avoidance, supra note 45, at 684–85. 
140. See The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1362 (confirming Congress’s authority to limit the 
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts with regard to certain civil cases (citing, inter alia, Sheldon
v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850)); see also id. at 1365 (“As to civil plaintiffs, no. Congress has
plenary power to distribute jurisdiction among such inferior federal constitutional courts as it
chooses to establish.”); Bradley & Siegel, supra note 54, at 258.
 141. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1372 (observing “a necessary postulate of constitutional
government—that a court must always be available to pass on claims of constitutional right to 
judicial process, and to provide such process if the claim is sustained”). A “total denial of
jurisdiction” is one thing; granting jurisdiction “but put[ting] strings on it” is quite another. Id.; 














     
      
  
     
 
 




   
 
   
    
   
      
   
  
   
 332019] JURISDICTION STRIPPING CIRCA 2020
limitation is invalid, Hart assumed that the normal judicial response
would simply be to excise it.142 
Hart’s approach has explanatory power well beyond the 
enforcement-court context. Consider, for example, plaintiffs who are 
neither defendants nor potential defendants. The well-known portal-
to-portal cases—a Hart and Wechsler casebook staple143—are
illustrative. To the surprise of many, the Supreme Court construed the 
term “work week” in the Fair Labor Standards Act to include travel 
time and other preliminary activities for iron-ore miners. The result 
was to impose a massive, unanticipated cost on coal companies. In 
response, Congress retroactively abrogated the Court’s holding. By 
way of precaution, Congress also deprived all federal and state courts 
of subject-matter jurisdiction over suits seeking to enforce the
judicially defined obligation. Beneficiaries of the Court’s prior ruling 
assailed that legislation as an unconstitutional deprivation of vested
property rights. Hart thought it quite clear that state courts could not 
be prevented from examining the validity of a congressional limitation 
on their subject-matter jurisdiction.144 Applying severability analysis,
therefore, a federal court could fairly conclude that, in such
circumstances, Congress would not have intended that the subject-
matter limit on its jurisdiction should survive if the state court could
address the merits.
This, however, is decidedly not how Hart himself approached the 
severability problem.145 He focused entirely on the legislation’s 
see also id. at 1373 (“I can easily read into Article III a limitation on the power of Congress to tell 
the court how to decide the case.”). Hart cites Chief Justice Hughes in Crowell, but Hughes also
invoked the Due Process Clause.
 142. Id. at 1372 (“[A] court must always . . . provide [judicial] process if the claim [of 
constitutional right to judicial process] is sustained.”). Applying severability analysis, however, an
enforcement court could conclude that it must decline jurisdiction entirely.
 143. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 326 (discussing Battaglia v. General Motors
Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948)). For further consideration of Battaglia, see Fallon, Jurisdiction-
Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1101–04. 
144. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1401. Hart adds: “In the scheme of the Constitution, [the
state courts] are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they may be
the ultimate ones.” Id. For recent discussion, see generally Michael C. Dorf, Congressional Power
to Strip State Courts of Jurisdiction, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2018).
145. The First Edition makes no suggestion of a mode of analysis that focused on the
restriction of state-court jurisdiction. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 325–26. Neither
did the Second Edition. See PAUL M. BATOR, PAUL J. MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO & HERBERT 
WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL SYSTEM 313–22
(2d ed. 1974). A state-court-focused analysis is suggested in the Third Edition. See  HART AND 
WECHSLER, 3d Edition, supra note 49, at 377. 
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limitation on federal-court jurisdiction.146 Hart argued that if, as a 
substantive matter, the federal legislation constituted an 
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty or property, the jurisdictional 
limitation fell with it on inseparability grounds.147 Summarily advanced 
in the portal-to-portal cases,148 this mode of analysis received fuller 
elaboration later in The Dialogue. Hart’s clearest exposition is as
follows: 
A. You sound as if you thought you finally had me in a corner. But 
after what we’ve been through the answer to this one is easy, isn’t it— 
so long as there is any applicable grant of general jurisdiction? 
Obviously, the answer is that the validity of the jurisdictional
limitation depends on the validity of the program itself, or the 
particular part of it in question. If the court finds that what is being 
done is invalid, its duty is simply to declare the jurisdictional
limitation invalid also, and then proceed under the general grant of
jurisdiction.149 
Relief, for Hart, would still then be appropriate under the statutes 
that granted general jurisdiction, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the 
habeas statute.150 (This approach to severability seems to have been the 
view taken by the courts of appeal that considered the portal-to-portal
controversy.151) 
At first blush, Hart’s analysis seems at variance with the Court’s 
holdings that justiciability questions must be addressed before the 
merits are reached.152 But, as a logical matter, any such conclusion is 
not clear. Hart seems to have viewed the right holder as seeking relief
146. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1383–88. 
147. At least in our legal order, “no workable system of judicial review could function without
a large role for severability.” Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 370 (2007). 
148. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1383. 
149. Id. at 1387; see also Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1104 
(observing that “jurisdictional questions” cannot be disentangled from “questions involving
substantive rights to relief”).
 150. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1397. Hart, of course, fully understood that the federal
court could not entertain the case unless some statute authorized jurisdiction. Hart does not 
discuss the possibility that severability analysis might dictate dismissal of the litigation rather than
a decision on the merits.
 151. Id. at 1383 n.67. 
152. The landmark here is, of course, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S.
83, 101 (1998) (rejecting hypothetical jurisdiction). See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at
55–56 & n.3. For a collection of recent materials exploring this topic, see generally First
Amendment—Freedom of Speech—Commercial Speech: Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman, in Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 223 (2017).
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under the existing general jurisdictional grants, with the jurisdictional 
limitation appearing as a sort of (invalid) defense to the exercise of that 
jurisdiction. Under this conception, the limitation fell with the Act’s 
substantive invalidity.153 The source and scope of Hart’s severability
analysis remains puzzling, however. Is it beyond congressional control 
or the states’ reach?154 Could it be overcome by a clear congressional 
statement? Does it matter if the state courts are free to address the
issues? Or is his severability principle rooted somewhere in the specific 
substantive constitutional provision under attack? These questions are 
left unexplored. Moreover, Hart ultimately backed away from his own
analysis: “Well, now, I’ll have to stall a little. Habeas corpus aside, I’d
hesitate to say that Congress couldn’t effect an unconstitutional 
withdrawal of jurisdiction—that is, a withdrawal to effectuate 
unconstitutional purposes—if it really wanted to.”155 
Hart’s approach is troubling at a deeper level. It is at least 
suggestive of, or may indeed prefigure, a general constitutional rule
that mandates the inseparability of state (and federal) statutes when
the significant purpose (or perhaps even the effect?) of the statute is to 
obstruct the vindication of a constitutional right.156 Hart and Wechsler
suggest157 that, despite the Court’s reliance on the effects of the 
regulation, this is how that we might understand the Court’s recent 
inseparability holding in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, which
involved a detailed state statute clearly designed to restrict abortion 
153. Boumediene seems to have taken this approach: Newly enacted statutory limits on the
prior habeas statutory grant were held to be invalid. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 
(2008) (invoking the Suspension Clause).
154. At one point, Hart quite unconvincingly suggests that this approach expresses probable
legislative intent. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1387. Quite the contrary, of course. Jurisdiction 
stripping sends quite the opposite signal.
 155. Id. at 1398–99. Hart recognized that for Congress to close access to the federal courts
would be very difficult unless it were prepared to do considerable on-the-ground damage to
federal-court jurisdiction. See id. at 1396–1401. 
156. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 177–95. This is a doctrine that I have resisted 
in other contexts. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1
(discussing the separability doctrine in the context of First Amendment overbreadth-doctrine
cases). See also Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1104 (discussing this
topic). And, of course, see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776 (“Unlike in Hayman and Swain, here
we confront statutes, the DTA and the MCA, that were intended to circumscribe habeas
review.”). This treats separability as only a matter of legislative intent.
 157. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JACK L. GOLDSMITH, JOHN F. MANNING, DAVID L. SHAPIRO
& AMANDA L. TYLER, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 14–16 (7th ed. Supp. 2019). 
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access.158 Severability of state statutes is generally understood to be a 
matter of state law. Considered separately, many of the act’s 
substantive provisions seemed facially valid; moreover, the state 
statute contained a sweeping severability clause. But taken together, 
the ostensibly separate provisions were clearly and closely united by a 
single purpose to obstruct the underlying constitutional right. This 
form of analysis is not grounded in Article III but in the specific 
constitutional provision that is at issue. The Court’s even more recent 
and controversial separability analysis in Murphy v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, involving a federal statute, might also be recast 
along these lines.159 
Hart’s purpose-focused separability analysis is, I believe, not a
typical “undue burden on the right” analysis, which is generally more
context-specific and limited in scope. It is a per se rule—one 
independent of such variables as whether the state courts are open. 
Indeed, it could be framed as a claim that the legislation, taken as a
whole, lacked a valid legislative purpose.160 And since such a purpose-
oriented severability rule would apply generally, it would largely 
pretermit any discussion of whether, unlike other Article III courts, the
Supreme Court has a separate and uncompromisable “essential role.” 
B. Article III Courts and “Public Rights” 
Hart fully endorsed the conventional understanding that the 
Constitution endows Congress with large discretion to shape the actual 
institutions of our government. Congress, therefore, is free to confer 
upon the inferior Article III courts such subject-matter jurisdiction as 
158. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318–20 (2016) (finding that no
provision of H.B. 2 was severable from the unconstitutional provision at issue); see also Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 147 (1908) (finding draconian penalties to be a separate violation of due 
process when their purpose was to discourage a judicial challenge asserting that legislatively
prescribed rates were confiscatory). 
159. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1482–84 (2018) (finding, over 
a sharp dissent, that no provision of PASPA was severable from the unconstitutional provision at 
issue). This is a topic that requires further thought although this might be one question that 
remains ambiguous. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. For an incisive criticism of the 
Court’s severability analysis, see Leading Cases, supra note 80, at 392–96 (criticizing the Court in 
Murphy for adopting a “coherence” approach rather than assessing whether the separate
provisions were independently viable).
 160. See Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1080–81 (observing the 
Court’s use of motive or purpose tests in contemporary constitutional law to “stop legislatures
from achieving indirectly aims that the Constitution would forbid the government to pursue
directly”).
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it deems appropriate.161 But that freedom is not boundless. When Hart 
wrote, the generally accepted understanding was that some types of 
“adjudication,” were they to occur at the national level, could take 
place only in Article III tribunals.162 The Dialogue itself makes no 
direct effort to engage with that tradition; indeed, it has quite an 
ahistorical cast to it. Standing alone, however, The Dialogue cannot 
sensibly be understood without understanding the background of the 
debate about Article III tribunals. To that background we now turn. 
Trials for federal crimes within a state provided a clear example of
the need for adjudication by Article III courts,163 but these cases were
not the only examples. In American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of
Cotton (Canter), a federal territorial court in Florida had exercised 
admiralty court prize court jurisdiction.164 Within one of the states, 
Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged, such adjudication would have 
violated Article III.165 But such tribunals were not required in the 
territories;166 nor, the Court subsequently held, were they required 
when military tribunals are properly convened.167 Palmore v. United
States extended the territorial ruling from Canter to the District of
Columbia.168 In Ortiz v. United States, the entire Court reaffirmed this
line of authorities, stressing that “exceptional [congressional] powers” 
were at play in the territories and the District of Columbia.169 But
161. The standard citation is Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How) 441 (1850). For a recent
discussion, see Home Depot U.S.A. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019).
162. The judges of the Article III courts were thought to be sufficiently insulated from 
congressional or executive control. So, too, were the state courts. Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative
Courts, Legislative Power, and the Constitution, 65 IND. L.J. 291, 299–300 (1990).
 163. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1365–66; see Martin S. Lederman, The Law (?) of the
Lincoln Assassination, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 323 (2018) (examining the constitutionality of
military trials for individuals other than members of the armed forces). The extent to which state 
courts must or could exercise jurisdiction over federal criminal offenses has a long and
controversial history that I have no need to pursue here. 
164. Am. Ins. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 513–14 (1828).
 165. Id. at 545.
 166. Id. at 546.
167. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857).
168. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 390 (1973). In Palmore, the Court held that
criminal trials in the District of Columbia do not require an Article III court. Id. Such trials can
occur in legislative courts created under Article I. Id. The assimilation of the status of the District
of Columbia to that of the territories is strongly criticized in James Durling, The District of
Columbia and Article III, 107 GEO. L. REV. 1205 (2019). 
169. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2178 (2018) (quoting N. Pipeline Const. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982)); id. at 2196–97 (Alito, J., dissenting). I agree with
the result, but the exceptional power rationale leaves me unpersuaded. But, for the purposes of
this Article, that disagreement is not important. 
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Justice Alito, in a dissent joined by Justice Gorsuch, concluded that the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over military courts was lacking because 
military tribunals exercised “executive,” not judicial, power.170 Relying 
heavily on the existing case law, and more specifically its own history
of reviewing such tribunals, the majority disagreed.171 So too did Justice
Thomas in a separate concurrence.172 Of course, the underlying 
premise of these holdings was that, exceptions for special tribunals 
aside, national adjudication must take place only in Article III courts.173 
This is not the end of the debate, however. The Court has fashioned a 
third, and by far the most important, exception to Article III 
adjudication: the “public rights” doctrine, customarily associated with 
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.174 
What, then, are public rights? This category has not proved to be
altogether stable.175 Throughout the nineteenth century, it typically
referred to “rights” held by the general public in gross rather than by 
any specific individuals. The question often involved discerning under
what circumstances members of the general public could sue to 
vindicate such rights.176 Caleb Nelson describes the early 
understanding: 
170. Id. at 2198–2202 (Alito, J., dissenting). I would note that Supreme Court review was not 
of the decision of the courts-martial but of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Justice
Kagan elides the two (as I would not), and Justice Alito seems to give the distinction no real
attention. See id.
 171. Id. at 2178 (majority opinion) (acknowledging that “we have lumped the three together”
in reference to the military, territories, and District of Columbia).
 172. Id. at 2186–88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
173. They are usually characterized as “exceptions.” See, e.g., id. at 2178 n.7; Stern v. Marshall,
564 U.S. 462, 489–90 (2011); HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 296–98. Professor Nelson 
would prefer to characterize them as simply not involving the exercise of the Article III judicial
power. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 574–77. Building on the 
prior work of his colleague, Professor Harrison, Nelson asserts that nineteenth-century
conceptions of what constituted an exercise of the “judicial power” in a separation-of-powers
framework were dependent upon the nature of the claims before the Court. Id. at 590. 
174. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
175. The central division in Oil States, discussed infra notes 186–93 and accompanying text,
was over whether, after its issuance, a patent over an invention was a public or a private right. See 
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1381–85 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that a patent is a private right). 
176. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 689, 693 (2004) (“Public rights are those that belong to the body politic. They may
include interests generally shared, such as those in the free navigation of waterways, passage on 
public highways, and general compliance with regulatory law.” (footnote omitted)); see also
Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 563 (speaking of “nineteenth-
century precedents” distinguishing between public and private rights).
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From the outset, American lawyers thought it “quite natural” to
distinguish legal interests that were vested in discrete individuals from
legal interests that belonged to the public as a whole. . . . 
To illustrate the category of “public rights belonging to the people 
at large,” early American lawyers tended to point to three different
kinds of legal interests: (1) proprietary rights held by government on
behalf of the people, such as the title to public lands or the ownership 
of funds in the public treasury; (2) servitudes that every member of 
the body politic could use but that the law treated as being collectively
held, such as rights to sail on public waters or to use public roads; and 
(3) less tangible rights to compliance with the laws established by
public authority “for the government and tranquility of the whole.” 
At any given time, the law recognized many such “public rights”— 
interests that enjoyed legal protection, but that belonged to “the
whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate 
capacity.”177 
Thus, a suit involving a “public right” necessarily dealt with issues
affecting the community at large rather than merely the individual.
Nineteenth-century legal thought was even more complex. In 
addition to the public rights described above, nineteenth-century 
governments (like those of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries) 
awarded contracts, franchises, licenses, and other “privileges.”178 While
often folded within the third category of Nelson’s public rights,179 these
interests were sufficiently distinctive to merit separate consideration. 
For some purposes, they were treated as full-fledged property; for 
others, they were something less.180 The fundamental inquiry here 
often was to ascertain when, if ever, these kinds of property interests 
became sufficiently “vested” so as to be entitled to the protections 
accorded to common law liberty or property.181 
Subject to unending criticism along the lines of coherence and,
more importantly, utility, the public rights doctrine nonetheless still 
177. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 566 (footnotes omitted)
(first quoting Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 21 (N.Y. 1829) (Walworth, C.); then quoting 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *7; and then quoting id. at *5).
 178. Id. at 567–68, 571–72, 578–79. 
179. For a recent example, see Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1375.
 180. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 567–68. 
181. Id. at 569. Moreover, even with respect to franchises and privileges, “executive officials 
had to respect statutory privileges that [Congress] had . . . granted to private individuals and that
Congress had not authorized the [executive] official[] to abrogate.” Id. at 581 (emphasis omitted).
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looms large over the legal landscape.182 Indeed, Caleb Nelson insists 
that the doctrine now “is so deeply ingrained in American-style 
separation of powers, and so fundamental to our system of
government, that it cannot plausibly be excised.”183 As will appear 
below, to the extent that Nelson’s point is that courts can be expected 
to be more receptive to some claims than to others, I agree.
The important issue now is determining what falls within the 
compass of the public rights doctrine. That can matter quite 
considerably when the administrative adjudication claims legal
finality.184 Murray’s Lessee (dicta?) stated that Article III courts could
be entirely excluded from any role in public rights cases.185 And the 
182. See, e.g., Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1370; HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 354. 
183. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 565. He is, of course,
fully aware of the doctrine’s critics. Id. at 564 nn.16–17 (collecting sources). His concern is with
the scope current of “public rights,” which he sees as now extending to what is historically
understood as private rights. Much of the current public rights doctrine now seems
counterintuitive. A private litigant seems in need of the protection of a constitutionally
independent Article III judge when facing a government action seeking to enforce a deprivation
of liberty or property far more when an adjudicator is simply asked to umpire a dispute between
private parties. But here, as elsewhere, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” N.Y. Tr.
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.); see also  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of law has not been logic: it has been experience.”). And
the distinction was far less indefensible in nineteenth-century political thought.
184. Professor Nelson describes his own project as follows: 
Under what circumstances does the Constitution permit adjudicative decisions made
by Congress or executive agencies to enjoy the sort of finality that is typically associated
with judicial decisions? In particular . . . to make factual findings that courts are bound
to accept in subsequent litigation, or to resolve legal disputes involving private 
individuals in a way that will itself have legal consequences? This question goes to the
heart of the modern administrative state . . . .
Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 563.
185. Specifically, it states:
To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it proper to state that we
do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or
admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which,
from its nature, is not a subject for judicial determination. At the same time there are
matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial
power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination,
but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the
United States, as it may deem proper.
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855). The Dialogue,
supra note 4, at 1368 n.26, also quotes this language. So does the Court in Stern v. Marshall, 564
U.S. 462, 488 (2011). Justices Alito and Gorsuch may be of the same view. See Ortiz v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2202 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[P]ublic rights disputes are exceptions
to Article III: the Federal Government can adjudicate [them] without exercising its judicial
power.”). The suggestion, however, was a casual one in the course of lengthy opinion, and Hart 
and Wechsler submit that Murray’s Lessee’s sweeping statement may be somewhat overbroad.
See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 354–55. 
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Court’s decision in the 2017 Term in Oil States Energy Services, LLC
v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC drew heavily upon the public-versus-
private rights framework to uphold administrative revocation of a 
patent because the patent had been invalidly issued.186 While patents 
may very well be private property vis-à-vis third parties, the Court 
noted that against the government they “convey only a specific form of 
property right—a public franchise.”187 And, to the Court, the process 
of administrative patent revocation seemed not meaningfully different 
from that of patent issuance. Accordingly, patent revocation fell 
“squarely within the public-rights doctrine.”188 Once determined to be
a matter of public right, Murray’s Lessee made plain that improperly
issued patents could be administratively revoked without violating 
Article III (or the Seventh Amendment).189 
Considerable uncertainties still remain in the wake of Oil States, 
however. The Court carefully noted that Article III judicial review
(apparently Administrative Procedure Act-style) of the administrative 
revocation decision was available, and it declined to opine on whether 
that was constitutionally required.190 Moreover, in rejecting the
argument that patent revocation constituted an exercise of Article III 
“judicial power,” the Court said that only the rights of the government 
and the patent holder were at issue; the patent revocation “does not 
make any binding determination” regarding a then-pending patent 
infringement suit between the patent holder and an alleged infringer.191 
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent insisted that, after its issuance, a patent 
became a private right. Relying on history and nineteenth-century 
precedent, he said that only a court could invalidate it.192 
Whether Oil States is a harbinger of change is difficult to gauge.
There is an air of quite astonishing unreality to the decision. Despite
extended briefing on the matter, no opinion considered how the patent 
system was, and is, actually administered or whether administrative
patent revocation subject to APA-style review made contemporary
186. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1365.
 187. Id. at 1375. 
188. Id. at 1373. The Court apparently believes that any government franchise should be
treated as a qualified one. See id. at 1375. 
189. Id. at 1379. No opinion mentioned 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2018), which allows an arbitration to
decide, as between the parties, patent validity. 
190. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379. The Court also noted that an existing (valid?) patent could
constitute property for purposes of the Due Process and Takings Clauses. Id.
 191. Id. at 1378. 
192. Id. at 1381–85 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
MONAGHAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2019 3:03 PM      








    
 
  
   









       
  
     
   
   
  
 
   
42 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
sense. At the end of the day, all that the Court did was uphold the now-
familiar APA pattern of agency fact-finding and judicial law 
declaration. But the heavy emphasis in both the majority and dissent 
on the need to frame the analysis within the public-versus-private-
rights landscape could lead to greater judicial involvement when 
“private” rights are involved. Moreover, the strong grip of the 
resolving power of these categories on the current Court is itself 
arresting.193 
C. Public Rights and Judicial Review 
Nineteenth-century separation of powers theory required
intensive judicial involvement with any governmental interference
with what were then understood as a limited (Lockean) category of 
private rights. That meant, Professor Nelson apparently insists, that 
nineteenth-century courts decided all questions of law and of
adjudicative fact de novo.194 No finality could attach to either 
administrative determination. Substantively, however, judicial 
protection was apparently quite limited, barring only imposition of 
retroactive liability.195 This is consistent with the early- and mid-
nineteenth-century conception that the Contract Clause provided the 
principal federal constitutional barrier against retroactive state
legislation.196 
193. See Leading Cases, supra note 80, at 312 (“The groundwork for Oil States was laid by the 
Court’s recent attempts to wall off a core set of issues for Article III courts without greatly 
disturbing its previous accommodations to modern government.”). In a brief opinion by Justice 
Breyer, three Justices rejected such a rigid framework. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379–80. But see
Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2185 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (relying on that
framework).
 194. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 590–93, 597–98. Private
rights were “natural rights that individuals would enjoy even in the absence of political society.”
Id. at 567. Nelson lists possible exceptions to this framework, such as claims on the public treasury, 
tax collection, eminent domain, and immigration matters. Id. at 582–90. I should add here that 
Professor Nelson believes that I am overreading him on the scope of judicial review. He believes
that his article expresses more uncertainty on this issue than I recognize.
 195. Id. at 598.
196. Professor Nelson has nothing to say about the displacement of the Contracts Clause by
the Due Process Clauses at the end of the nineteenth century as the principal source of protection
for liberty and property. See Robert L. Hale,  The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57
HARV. L. REV. 852, 890–91 (1944). Those Clauses reach both retrospective and prospective 
interferences with liberty and property. Should Professor Nelson’s private-right-driven
conception of separation of powers no longer turn on retroactivity? Arguably not, of course, for 
an originalist who believes that substantive due process is an improper doctrine. On the current
languid status of the Contracts Clause, see generally Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018)
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Fast forward! Hart and Wechsler inform us that the current public
rights doctrine now embraces all federal governmentally enforced 
administrative action, whether retrospective or prospective, that would 
impose obligations on private persons, so long as such enforcement 
existed outside of the criminal-law context.197 The nature of the private-
party interest affected by the governmental conduct is immaterial.
Such an expansive reading, Professor Nelson maintains, sharply 
extends Murray’s Lessee itself as well as the nineteenth-century case
law.198 “Core” (a characterization greatly favored by Professor Nelson) 
private rights were not embraced within the nineteenth-century 
understanding of public rights, whether the source of the interference 
was by another private party or by the government.199 As I have 
previously written on the subject: 
(holding that the retroactive application of a Minnesota statute that says divorce revokes a
beneficiary designation does not violate the Contracts Clause).
 197. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 354 (listing three categories falling within
the public rights doctrine: “[C]laims against the United States for ‘money, land or other things’”;
“disputes arising from coercive governmental conduct outside of the criminal law”; and
“immigration cases “ (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 452 (1929))). The Court has
expanded the concept of public rights to include suits by one private party against another when
the right asserted is “integrally related to particular Federal Government action.” Stern v.
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 490–91 (2011). I do not explore the significance of this expansion. But
reconsider Crowell in this regard, as my colleague Jeremy  Kessler pointed out to me. The  
impressions created by various opinions give plausibility to this claim because a reader might well
assume that the entire process contemplated by the legislation was quite formal. The reality was
quite otherwise:
The federal statute was administered by the United States Employees’ Compensation
Commission, created in 1916 to administer the workers’ compensation program for
federal employees. The Commission’s work quickly became consumed by maritime
workers’ claims. Hearings were held before Deputy Commissioners, but hearings were
rare: In 1928 there were 32,000 reported maritime injuries, of which 338 were set for a 
hearing, and only fifteen reviewed in court. The administrative hearings were
“extremely informal,” with the hearing commissioner depending on “speed, and
thorough inquiry into the facts rather than upon procedural regularity.”
Tushnet, supra note 91, at 362 (quoting Theodore Baytop Stubbs, Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation: A Study of the U.S. Employees’ Compensation Commission in the 
Administration of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (1930)
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Harvard Law School)). The Crowell claimant was injured in July of
1927. Id. at 359. 
198. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 567–69. Murray’s Lessee
was in fact a land-title dispute between two private parties. But the ultimate question of title
turned on the validity of a prior governmental seizure and sale of the land without the 
participation of an Article III court. Moreover, some judicial review of the government’s action
was in fact available. Id. at 586–88. 
199. Id. at 566–68. Historically, this was a narrow set of rights that was thought to be “pre-
political” and therefore not dependent on the government. Id. at 567.
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[T]here has always been in our traditions particular concern with the 
judicial role where governmental interference with the “private 
rights” of “liberty” and “property” was involved. This linkage is
reflected in Marbury’s declaration that the “province of the Court is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,” and it constituted a vital
component in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century efforts at
demarcating the permissible limits of administrative power. So long
as public administration made few demands on private persons (apart
from taxes and custom duties) no threat was posed to the “sacred” 
rights of liberty and property. But with the advent of the regulatory
administrative state in the late nineteenth century, judicial concern 
grew. It was a widely shared belief that disputes arising from the
application of congressional regulatory power must ultimately be
resolved in article III courts and thus could not be left for final
administrative determination.200 
While he does not explicitly refer to it, Hart’s thinking was firmly 
set within the old rule-of-law tradition.201 So too was that of his eminent 
colleague Louis Jaffe. Writing a dozen years after Hart, Jaffe explored 
the topic more extensively. Administrative interference (Hart’s 
“coercion”) with traditional conceptions of liberty or property 
required judicial supervision, he insisted, although not quite to the 
extent supposed in the nineteenth century.202 
Essentially, and without any explanation, Hart bypassed the 
public-versus-private rights framework. His starting point was 
different. For him, what was crucial was the distinction between
enforcement and nonenforcement courts. Was the court being asked
to enforce governmentally prescribed duties, whether defined by
Congress or an agency, in a suit by the government or a private 
200. Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 17 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)).
201. Murray’s Lessee is laconically dismissed, with the observation that the Court “upheld a 
summary procedure, without benefit of the courts, for the collection by the United States of 
moneys claimed to be due from one of its customs collectors.” The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1368
n.26. Hart also believed that a taxpayer has a right to a judicial hearing to contest the legality of
a tax. Id. at 1369. And, as I shall show, he recoiled against judicially unchecked administrative 
deprivations of liberty or property. 
202. Jaffe addresses this issue in Chapter 9 of JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION. JAFFE, supra note 28, at 320–94. A particularly relevant discussion of the need for
judicial supervision when the deprivation of liberty or property is at issue begins on page 383. Id. 
at 383. Professor Jaffe insisted that the Constitution required judicial review of the legality—not 
just the constitutionality—of governmental conduct imposing restraints and obligations. Id. at 
394.
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party?203 Article III itself was empty, however, unless the jurisdiction
of those courts was actually invoked. This was essentially Justice 
Brandeis’s position in Crowell v. Benson.204 Hart put the point this way:
It’s hard, for me at least, to read into Article III any guarantee to
a civil litigant of a hearing in a federal constitutional court (outside
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court) if Congress chooses to 
provide some alternative procedure. The alternative procedure may 
be unconstitutional. But, if so, it seems to me it must be because of
some other constitutional provision, such as the Due Process 
Clause.205 
In the pre-modern nineteenth-century administrative state, when
core private rights were at stake, Hart’s formulation could have passed
unnoticed, because “[j]udicial power and due process rationales were
tightly joined.”206 But for us, Article III and due process are no longer
tightly linked. And as Professor Jaffe noted, that separation can matter: 
The proposition that due process may require a certain measure of
judicial process may be thought just another way of saying that the 
judiciary is the constitutional organ for the determination of 
questions of legal power. Each does, however, approach the question 
from a somewhat different direction, and may in some cases give 
different answers. Due process emphasizes the protection of
individual rights or interests. Judicial power emphasizes the control
of executive action and can be used to support judicial intervention
even when individual rights are not involved. Due process is thus a 
narrower, more limited rationale. It could be argued that, at least 
under our American version of separation of powers, a constitutional
power in the judiciary to check the executive is historically validated
203. To the maximum extent possible, Hart would apply the same principles when pre-
enforcement challenges were before the court. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
204. In his dissenting opinion in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), Justice Brandeis wrote:
There is . . . nothing [in Article III] which requires any controversy to be determined
as of first instance in the federal District Courts. The jurisdiction of those courts is
subject to the control of Congress. Matters which may be placed within their
jurisdiction may instead be committed to the state courts. If there be any controversy
to which the judicial power extends that may not be subjected to the conclusive 
determination of administrative bodies or federal legislative courts, it is . . . because,
under certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a 
requirement of judicial process.
Id. at 86–87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
205. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1372–73.
 206. Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 17. “[I]n fact, the first decision imposing due 
process constraints on the states required judicial review of a claim that administratively
prescribed rates were confiscatory.” Id. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 
30, demonstrates this point exhaustively.
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only when personal rights are in question, and that to carry judicial
power beyond this contravenes the doctrine of separation.207 
Nelson’s nineteenth-century judicial world hinges entirely on the 
nature of the claims (i.e., rights or privileges) asserted. That
determination, in turn, defines the nature of the judicial duty.208 Hart
began from a different starting point: conceptions of limited 
government and the rule of law.209 When Hart wrote, administrative-
fact-finding cases, even in the classic case of private right (A v. B), had
become commonplace. Crowell v. Benson and its predecessors 
accorded finality to those findings if supported by substantial evidence.
In so doing, Crowell established (or at least confirmed) the foundation
of the modern administrative state. It is a bit dismissive, I believe— 
albeit technically correct—to say that all that was at stake in Crowell
was the status of “jurisdictional facts” and whether the court has to
create its own record on these facts.210 The elaborate opinions suggest 
otherwise. I agree with Professor Tushnet that:
[Hughes’s] opinion became one of the foundations of modern
administrative law . . . . As in other areas of the law, Hughes played a 
transitional role. Here as elsewhere he developed constitutional
doctrine that acknowledged the force of an older tradition while
opening the path for doctrines that would support newer institutions.
Unsurprisingly, then, in the decision’s immediate aftermath, critics 
emphasized its backward-looking features and failed to emphasize 
enough its forward-looking ones.211 
He concluded that “[m]ore broadly, it validated the modern 
administrative state.”212 Crowell, in fact, is a flagship in our 
administrative state.
Nonetheless, Hart’s view that Article III is entirely empty unless
its jurisdiction is actually engaged was and, as Oil States reminds us,
207. JAFFE, supra note 27, at 379–80. 
208. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 590.
 209. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1390. 
210. See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 981 (2011). For Professor Merrill, 
Crowell is, despite its centrality in chapter 4 of the casebook, in fact something of a poster child.
Precedents originating under the Hepburn Act had effectively established the appellate (i.e.,
APA) style of judicial review. Id.
 211. Tushnet, supra note 91, at 360.
 212. Id. at 388.
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still remains a minority one.213 “Almost no one disputes the highly 
general principle that Article III imposes some limits on Congress’
authority to vest judicial power in non-Article III federal tribunals, but 
there is much less consensus or certainty concerning precisely what 
those limits are.”214 Hart’s focus, however, was on the government’s 
practical need to use the Article III courts when imposing obligations
on private parties.215 For him, that would be the standard situation, and
at that point, Article III itself fastened duties on those courts. 
D. Limitations on Enforcement Courts: Their Validity 
Murray’s Lessee stated that Article III courts could be excluded 
entirely in cases of public rights, a category now seemingly including 
any governmental action against private individuals outside of the 
criminal law context.216 But giving complete finality to administrative
deprivation of common law liberty and property rights (and other 
“rights”) would run sharply counter to our entire constitutional 
history.217 No federal legislation of which I am aware has wholly
excluded Article III courts from examining administrative deprivations 
of traditional liberty or property rights.218 
Nor did Hart endorse any such sweeping public rights finality 
doctrine. He insisted that, at least in an enforcement proceeding,
Article III itself required that the court review de novo administrative
determinations of the controlling law.219 
1. Civil proceedings. In an ordinary civil proceeding, the court,
sometimes with the aid of jurors and masters, resolves every issue in 
213. In Oil States, most of the members of the Court assumed that if private rights were 
involved, they could be adjudicated only in an Article III court. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v.
Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018).
 214. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 36.
 215. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1397 (“Remember the Federalist papers. Were the framers
wholly mistaken in thinking that, as a matter of the hard facts of power, a government needs
courts to vindicate its decisions? Is there some new science of government that tells how to do it
in some other way?”). 
216. See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374; HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 354. Oil States
could be grounded in a similar premise. But that is quite unclear given the concurrence, the 
dissent, and the relatively unproblematic nature of the case to most members of the Court. See 
also Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2184–89 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing
concern for judicial protection of private rights).
 217. See Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 21–22, 22 n.126.
 218. Oil States expressly reserves opining on the validity of any such legislation, even with
respect to governmentally granted franchises. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379. 
219. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1375–79. 
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the case before it. But what if some or all of these issues are assigned 
to an administrative agency for determination, with limited (i.e., partial 
“jurisdiction stripping”) Article III court review? In civil enforcement 
proceedings, Hart believed that Article III was implicated. He
endorsed the entire Court’s stance in Crowell. Law declaration was an 
independent obligation of Article III enforcement courts.220 But like 
Brandeis, Hart believed that questions of fact, whether “ordinary” or 
“jurisdictional,” could legitimately be resolved elsewhere, even in 
private right cases, at least so long as nothing analogous to a common-
law right requiring a jury was involved.221 Any requirement of 
independent judicial fact-finding or of independent judicial judgment,
whether on its own or in an administrative record, must find its roots 
in other provisions of the Constitution, not in Article III.222 And no
such requirement ordinarily existed, except perhaps in cases of 
personal liberty.223 This leaves me with the conviction that Hart would 
220. Brandeis’s due-process-based reference to the requirements of the “supremacy of the
law” seems to describe the duty of all courts. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 
U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Hart’s analysis is more clearly tethered to Article
III. In Crowell, the Justices, it should be noted, endorsed error correction—not ultra vires
review—of legal issues.
 221. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1375–77. Hart cited Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932),
with approval on this point. See The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1373. Hart thought that the Seventh
Amendment would rarely be implicated in administrative adjudication. Id. at 1375. This
observation is confirmed by the plurality opinion in Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379. 
222. Crowell, 285 U.S at 51. Professor Jaffe agreed: “[F]act finding by a judge is not a basic 
premise of our system of justice.” JAFFE, supra note 27, at 89; see also id. at 595–96. Interestingly, 
Professor Nelson (an ardent originalist scholar) seems to accept administrative fact finding, 
acquiescing in Crowell’s “somewhat artificial” description of administrative agencies as judicial
“adjuncts” in private right cases. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 
601. This concession, I believe, is a setback for his efforts to reconcile originalism with our modern
legal order. See also Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 124 n.377
(gently chiding Nelson).
 223. The Dialogue discusses this, stating:
Q. Where does the Ben Avon-Crowell-St. Joseph rule stand now? 
A. Most commentators question its present vitality, at least in the field of civil liability.
Certainly, the recent decisions on rate-making, to which the commentators point,
reflect such altered views of the applicable constitutional restraints as to leave little
room for the Ben Avon question to arise within its original field. The same thing is true
in other areas of administrative action. Putting aside questions of personal liberty
where the governing criteria are likely to be more rigorous, constitutionality, as
distinguished from statutory authority, will rarely turn upon the concrete factual
situation sought to be reviewed.
The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1376–77 (footnotes omitted). The Suspension Clause, the First
Amendment, and other constitutional guarantees may also impose such a requirement. See, e.g., 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510–11 (1984); Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233, 232–35 (1985) [hereinafter Monaghan, 
Constitutional Fact Review]; Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L.
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have little trouble sustaining the considerable expansion of the dispute-
resolving authority of the magistrate judges, even in cases of private
right.224 Hart basically endorsed what is now commonly referred to as
the appellate review model of Article III, of which Crowell v. Benson
is the standard bearer.225 
2. Criminal proceedings.  Hart was even more greatly troubled by 
shutting off review of any legal question from an Article III criminal 
enforcement court even though alternative Article III review was, or 
had been, at least ostensibly available elsewhere.226 Yakus v. United
States was a focus.227 To summarize briefly, during the Second World
War, Congress imposed price controls. The legislation channeled all
challenges to the administrative regulations and orders to a special
emergency court composed of Article III judges. Yakus upheld this 
framework, holding that Congress could effectively bar any challenge 
to the question of whether a particular price regulation violated the 
statutory mandate (and/or was confiscatory) in a criminal enforcement 
proceeding.228 Greatly troubled, Hart seemed somewhat mollified 
REV. 518, 550–51 (1970) [hereinafter Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process”]. For a
vigorous defense of constitutional fact review, see generally Martin H. Redish & William D. Gohl,
The Wandering Doctrine of Constitutional Fact, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 289 (2017).
 224. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 390–94 (describing expansion). I doubt that Hart 
would find objectionable the line of decisions leading up to Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v.
Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014). Of the consent-based theory of adjudication by a non-Article III
judge elaborated upon in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 
(2015), I am less sure. But if litigants are prepared to waive the protections of Article III, Hart
advances no reason and I myself see none to object. I recognize, of course, that there is a real
danger that the “consent” will not in fact be voluntary. For a more detailed analysis, see HART 
AND WECHSLER, 2019 supplement, at 52–53. 
225. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 389–90 n.8 (discussing Merrill, supra note 210, 
which it describes as “provid[ing] a careful historical study of the origins of the appellate review
model”). Merrill shows that the appellate-review model had taken firm hold well before Crowell
and traces its immediate origins to the Court’s reaction to passage of the Hepburn Act governing
railroad rates. The term appellate-review model itself seems to have originated with Professor
Fallon. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III,
101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 933 (1988). 
226. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1379–83. Whether an adequate alternative channel of
review in fact existed in Yakus is open to serious doubt. See JAFFE, supra note 27, at 391. 
227. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
 228. Id. at 429–31. The Court did allow a challenge to the entire underlying legislative 
framework and a meaningless facial challenge to the validity of the specific administrative rate
regulation. See id. at 419–27, 446–47. The enforcement court, however, could not examine the 
legislative facts underpinning the administrative regulation.  Id. at 425. 
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because review of those issues could be had in another Article III court 
“and everybody assumed it had to be.”229 
The precise scope of Yakus continues to vex the Supreme Court.230 
Suffice to say, however, that jurisdiction splitting in the enforcement
context faces a hostile Court, as a judicial decision at the end of the
2018 Term illustrates. PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris 
Chiropractic, Inc. apparently presented a Yakus issue, albeit in the civil
context.231 The relevant statutes could be read to limit the review of the
legality of certain Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
“orders” to the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the appropriate court of 
appeals, thereby foreclosing any such review by the district court in a 
civil enforcement proceeding.232 The FCC order at issue in PDR 
Network had not been reviewed, and the time limit for such review had 
expired.233 In a four-person concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh insisted 
that in those circumstances Yakus could have no applicability in a 
district court civil-enforcement proceeding unless the relevant statutes 
explicitly withdrew legality review from the district court.234 There is
no doubt that this view would apply a fortiori in the criminal context. 
The Court remanded the case to determine, in effect, whether the 
statutory scheme did in fact raise a Yakus problem.235 
The selective-service-draft cases troubled Hart even more. Estep
v. United States, a laconic opinion by Justice Douglas, said that, in a 
criminal proceeding for violating an induction order, “Congress 
enlisted the aid of the federal courts only for enforcement purposes.”236 
Apparently, an Article III court was simply to rubber stamp the 
administrative order. Heresy, of course! Estep “explained” the Court’s 
prior decision in Falbo v. United States,237 which foreclosed judicial 
review of the validity of the induction order, as turning on the failure 
to exhaust available remedies.238 But Estep then went on to say that 
229. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1380. 
230. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 842 (1987) (finding no finality to an
administrative order in a subsequent criminal proceeding based upon violation of the order when
no judicial challenge to the order had been realistically available).
231. PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2051 (2019). 
232. Id. at 2053. 
233. Id. at 2058 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment). 
234. Id. at 2064–65. 
235. See id. at 2056 (majority opinion). 
236. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 119 (1946).
237. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S 549 (1944).
 238. Estep, 327 U.S. at 123. 
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draft board exemption denials could be examined only for 
jurisdictional error.239 In other words, the only judicially examinable 
question was whether the decision had any basis in fact.240 Without 
explanation, Hart insisted that this standard of review was insufficient,
and thus, an Article III court was asked to enforce an administrative
order without it—or any other court—examining the legality of the 
order. He was decidedly not mollified by subsequent judicial efforts to 
explain Estep as a failure to exhaust administrative remedies with 
judicial review of the induction order postponed until the habeas
corpus stage.241 
E. The Enforcement Court’s Law Declaration Duty 
In Crowell, Brandeis said that the supremacy of the law requires 
that Article III enforcement courts independently determine all legal
questions. Error correction, not ultra vires or Chevron deference
review, was the appropriate role for these courts.242 The entire Court 
was agreed on that point.243 And Hart strongly insisted on that 
proposition: 
Q. The Crowell case also has a dictum that questions of law, including 
the question of the existence of evidence to support the 
administrative decision, must be open to judicial consideration. And 
you quoted Brandeis as saying that was necessary to the supremacy of 
law. Have those statements stood up?
A. If I can speak broadly and loosely, I’ll say yes—they have stood up.
Shutting off the courts from questions of law determinative of 
enforceable duties was one of the things Yakus assumed that 
Congress could not do. To be sure, that was a criminal case; but 
there’s no reason to suppose the Court would have made a different 
assumption if the sanction had been civil.244 
239. Id. at 122. The “exhaustion” requirement of Estep and Falbo has had little generative
effect. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 359 n.9 (noting that this requirement “will be
only selectively enforced”). 
240. Estep, 327 U.S. at 122–23; HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 322–23. For additional 
criticism of Estep, and particularly of Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence, see JAFFE, supra note 27,
at 392. 
241. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1382. 
242. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 89 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
243. Id. at 46, 49–50 (majority opinion).
 244. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1377 (first emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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For Hart, the phrase “must be open to judicial consideration” 
seemed to mandate de novo determination, at least when judicially 
enforced obligations involving liberty or property were involved. 
How well has Hart’s claim held up? Hart wrote in 1953, well 
before the rise—let alone the explosion—of agency rulemaking, and of
course, well before Chevron took formal hold.245 But even in Hart’s 
time, the difficulties of his position were apparent.246 Several 
adjudicatory labor law cases apparently held that agencies could 
formulate some legal propositions to which an Article III enforcement 
court would defer. Hart’s response is well worth quoting: 
Q. How do you explain cases like Gray v. Powell, and NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc.? Or, for that matter, O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-
Maxon, Inc.? Didn’t these cases allow the agencies to make final
determinations of questions of law? 
A. That depends on how you define “law.” I think Professor Davis is
right in saying that the term “law” in the first sentence I quoted from 
Justice Brandeis has to be read “as excluding the body of rules and 
principles that grow out of the exercise of administrative
discretion”—at least while the rules are in process of crystallizing.
In recent years we’ve recognized increasingly a permissible range
of administrative discretion in the shaping of judicially enforceable
duties. How wide that discretion should be, and what are the 
appropriate ways to control it, are crucial questions in administrative
law. But so long as the courts sit to answer the questions, the spirit of
Brandeis’ statement is maintained. And, since discretion by
hypothesis is not law, the letter of it is not in question. 
Q. But it’s notorious that there are all kinds of administrative 
decisions that are not reviewable at all. Professor Davis devotes a 
whole fat chapter to “Nonreviewable Action” of administrative
agencies.
A. Administrative law is a relatively new subject. Naturally there
have been a number of ill-considered decisions. But if you look
closely at Professor Davis’ cases you’ll find that almost all of them are 
245. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(setting forth the Chevron two-step analysis).
246. As noted earlier, agency lawmaking by notice-and-comment rulemaking is a
development that occurred after The Dialogue. See supra note 21. The decisions that troubled
Hart were agency lawmaking through administrative adjudication.




   
 















   
 
  
   
 
  
   
   
    
    
   
 
  
 532019] JURISDICTION STRIPPING CIRCA 2020
distinguishable. Many of them don’t involve judicially enforceable 
duties of the complaining party at all.247 
Then comes Hart’s classic claim:
Name me a single Supreme Court case that has squarely held that,
in a civil enforcement proceeding, questions of law can be validly 
withdrawn from the consideration of the enforcement court where no 
adequate opportunity to have them determined by a court has been
previously accorded. When you do, I’m going back to re-think 
Marbury v. Madison. 
Q. You put a lot of weight on the point of whether an enforceable 
legal duty is involved, don’t you?
A. Yes.248 
As I observed, shortly before Chevron was decided, “[t]he 
opposition of ‘discretion’ to ‘law’ cannot dissolve Hart’s problem,”
since “the result of the exercise of discretion is, as it was in Hearst, an
administrative formulation of a rule of law.”249 
Of course, Marbury could have been read as recognizing a
freestanding duty for an Article III court to determine for itself all of
the applicable law in any case properly before it, or in Hart’s narrower 
formulation, it could at least be read to require such determinations in 
an enforcement proceeding. But our jurisprudence simply did not 
develop along those lines. In constitutional cases, the Court (along with 
Hart?) seems to have assumed that constitutional meaning is always
open to it whenever the case is properly before it.250 When it comes to
statutory interpretation, however, I have written: “[T]here has never 
been a pervasive notion that limited government mandated an all-
encompassing judicial duty to supply all of the relevant meaning of 
247. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1377–78 (footnotes omitted). 
248. Id. at 1378–79 (footnotes omitted). This follows Brandeis in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co.
v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (“The supremacy of law demands that there shall be
opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied . . . .”); see 
also JAFFE, supra note 27, at 381–85. 
249. Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 29.
 250. Id. at 24. Consider, for example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) and 
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). Neither fits Hart’s definition of an
enforcement court. The plaintiffs were not making a challenge to the legality of governmentally
imposed legal duties. Rather, both cases were about correcting extra-judicial coercion. Both cases
involved a plaintiff seeking judicial assistance to vindicate their property rights from prior
administrative wrongdoing. Nonetheless, had Congress explicitly barred the Marbury Court from
considering the constitutionality of the mandamus statute, the congressional barrier would have
been ineffective, just as it was in Klein. 
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54 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
statutes. Rather, the judicial duty is to ensure that the administrative
agency stays within the zone of discretion committed to it by its organic
act.”251 Professor Bamzai’s recent article extensively documents the
Court’s practice of deferring to customary interpretation as well as to 
the contemporary understanding of those charged with the statute’s 
administration.252 This, he insists, was not the result of the modern idea 
of judicial “deference” to administrative interpretation but rather 
stems from reliance on judicially-developed conventions of statutory 
construction.253 That description has met sharp challenge by Craig
Green.254 But however described, the convention in fact reflects 
deference to administrative construction. Moreover, the older cases 
had no occasion to think deeply about the basis and structure of the
appropriate judicial-administrative relationship in our now vast,
complex, and modern administrative state. I do not pursue the matter
further, however. For me, what is important is that there never has
been an unbroken history of courts independently determining all the 
meaning of administrative statutes.
I have elsewhere also argued that Hart’s enforcement–non-
enforcement court dichotomy lacked justification: “[S]o long as the
court has general jurisdiction . . . why should the permissible limitations 
on the [Article III] court’s law-declaring competence vary with
whether the private litigant is asserting rights rather than defenses [or, 
I might add, privileges rather than rights]?”255 In each instance, the 
251. Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 33 (emphasis added); see also Peter L. Strauss,
“Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (explaining that Chevron “empower[s]” agencies “to act in a
manner that creates legal obligations”). Note that the context is civil, not criminal, cases.
 252. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE 
L.J. 908, 930–65 (2017). Erwin Griswold had made essentially this same point before Hart wrote 
The Dialogue. Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 
398, 404 (1941); see also Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the
Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007).
 253. Bamzai, supra note 252, at 930, 941, and especially 987 (arguing that deference was given 
only when the interpretive canons were involved).
254. In two articles, Craig Green provides a challenge to Professor Bamzai’s reading of history
in Constitutional Chevron Debates and the Transformation of American Law, 88 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. (May 2020) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), and goes on to provide a valuable political
history of Chevron, from Justice Scalia to Justice Gorsuch, in Deconstructing the Administrative
State: Chevron Debates and the Transformation of Constitutional Politics, 126–41 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
255. Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 24 (emphasis omitted).
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judicial power “is brought to bear to resolve the controversy in an 
authoritative manner.”256 
But that analysis may have understated Hart’s point. Further 
reflection convinces me that what really drove Hart’s analysis was not 
Article III or, more broadly, separation of powers concerns. Rather, it 
was the distinction between coercive and non-coercive governmental 
action. So understood, Hart drew upon our historical tradition, which
required a significant judicial role when there has been administrative 
interference with traditional common-law rights.257 Professor Jaffe 
developed this point in considerable detail in his splendid work, 
arguing that due process requires a judicial determination of the 
“legality” of any administrative deprivation with respect to common 
law liberty or property.258 And (pace Professor Nelson) our legal 
tradition has not been a static one, where the rights protected are a 
closed nineteenth-century set.259 We would now enlarge nineteenth-
century understandings of liberty and property to include all the 
interests that are now constitutionally embraced by the clauses and 
other constitutional provisions. 
Interestingly, Hart himself never actually explains why an Article 
III enforcement court must independently review all the relevant legal 
questions, including evidentiary sufficiency. Rather, he seems to have 
believed that this requirement self-evidently inheres in Brandeis’s 
notion of “the supremacy of the law.” Maybe it does. But if so, all sorts 
of questions abound. Are Article III courts unique in this law-
declaration responsibility? Are they unique only when acting as an
enforcement court? And in any event, why isn’t ultra vires review 
constitutionally sufficient, at least with respect to non-constitutional 
256. Id.
257. This, of course, is the central thrust of Professor Nelson’s article. See Nelson,
Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 572. Professor Jaffe makes the same point
with great force. JAFFE, supra note 27, at 382, 387–88. But he seems generally to require no more
than ultra vires review. 
258. JAFFE, supra note 27, at 388.
259. Hart’s conception of property seems to have rested on then-conventional common-law
conceptions, although he perceptively noted that it might be expanded to include denial of
benefits, entitlements, etc.: “[P]laintiffs complaining about governmental decisions which do not 
involve the direct coercion of private persons.” The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1386. But
formulating constitutional rules and standards beyond the area of administrative coercion of non-
common law, liberty and property has been, and is, a vexatious problem. See JAFFE, supra note 
27, at 382, 387–88. Statutes governing judicial review have largely made it unnecessary to confront
constitutional issues.
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questions?260 Why doesn’t the “supremacy of the law” also require that 
an Article III enforcement court examine all questions of jurisdictional 
fact, as Crowell held? Hart insists that any such demand must come
from the Due Process or Habeas Clauses, not Article III. They may 
indeed contain such a demand,261 but why does Article III itself not also
contain some such requirement? 
None of these questions is addressed, and so we are left with
puzzles about the roots of Hart’s own thinking, an unsurprising result 
when one recalls that The Dialogue was prepared only as part of one 
casebook chapter topic.262 Like the rest of the chapter, The Dialogue 
aimed to present a set of difficult inquiries. 
Finally, I must add that I am not sure exactly where Hart 
ultimately stood.263 In 1958, the celebrated “tentative edition” of Hart 
& Sacks’s The Legal Process appeared.264 The final chapter is devoted 
to statutory interpretation. Its final two paragraphs read:
A uniform interpretation by an administrative agency charged with
official responsibility of any kind under the statute should be given 
weight by a court. 
An interpretation by an administrative agency charged with first-line
responsibility for the authoritative application of the statute should 
be accepted by the court as conclusive, if it is consistent with the 
purpose properly to be attributed to the statute, and if it has been
arrived at with regard to the factors which should be taken into 
account in elaborating it.265 
This doesn’t sound much like The Dialogue. 
260. Compare Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 33–34, and Merrill, supra note 210, at
1001, with 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2018) (seeming to demand more than ultra vires review of legal
questions). Professor Jaffe seems to believe that generally ultra vires review, not independent 
judgment on legal questions, is all that is constitutionally required. JAFFE, supra note 27, at 570,
573.
 261. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, supra note 223, at 243. 
262. Perhaps he believed that some matters were so obviously engrained by our legal
traditions that they needed no elaboration.
 263. In The Dialogue, there is no real discussion of the distinction between independent
judgement and ultra vires review.
 264. HART & SACKS, supra note 6, at cxxxvii.
 265. Id. at 1380. 
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III. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEPRIVATIONS OF 
LIBERTY OR PROPERTY
As mentioned in the Introduction, Hart was deeply concerned
with administrative deprivations of liberty or property. Accordingly,
The Dialogue spends a good deal of time discussing possible access to
an Article III court to review such interferences, especially in situations
in which Congress has ostensibly restricted the courts’ jurisdiction.
Hart, however, focused less on the scope of judicial review of 
administrative actions and more with garnering access to an Article III 
court. With the growth of the administrative state since The Dialogue, 
coupled with recent calls for less judicial deference to agency action, 
this issue deserves more treatment than Hart gave it. To that we now 
turn.
A. Necessity and the Administrative State 
The door through which one enters is very frequently the same
door from which one exits. Professor Nelson’s description of the 
nineteenth-century judicial duty turns entirely on an antecedent 
background of Lockean rights, public rights, etc.—a background in 
which the judicial function depends on the kind of claim before the 
court.266 Hart’s view, I believe, stems from a conception of limited 
government that prohibits arbitrary governmental conduct. My entry 
point is somewhat different from Hart’s in emphasis: the complexity of 
modern government requires the administrative state.267 That
recognition, in turn, entails acceptance of some administrative norm-
setting authority, which further mandates some judicial deference to
administrative-law formulation.268 Professor Jaffe seems to me correct
when he wrote that “[i]f we admit that the administrative as well as the 
judiciary can, and within limits should, make law, our analytic problem 
is much simplified.”269 Nonetheless, as Professor Jaffe also pointed out 
266. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 590.
267. For more discussion on this topic, see the elaborate presentation by my colleague, Gillian
Metzger, in Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1
(2017). Similarly, see Jack M. Beermann, The Never-Ending Assault on the Administrative State, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1599 (2018). 
268. That view was—and is—widely shared. In addition to Metzger, supra note 267, see also, 
for example, Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1392, 1418 (2017). 
269. JAFFE, supra note 27, at 547 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 570, 573 (stating that an
agency should generally be permitted to choose among reasonable interpretations of a statute). 
“By the 1920s, courts consistently deferred to agency actions with respect to public health,
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58 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
in a widely admired observation, “judicial review is the necessary 
condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative
power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”270 Where core
private rights are implicated that proposition has long been recognized
by a wide and diverse range of writers.271 
The precise level of judicial control is, however, another matter.272 
It may very well be that, habeas aside, ultra vires review of 
administrative lawmaking is all that is constitutionally necessary in the
statutory context. The APA, however, arguably required more 
extensive judicial control, essentially codifying the doctrine laid down 
by Chief Justice Hughes in Crowell v. Benson.273 Such a codification 
would have reflected the view of the New York Bar that developed
during the rise of the New Deal. Led by Hughes and John Laird 
O’Brian, that Bar accepted administrative adjudication, but it believed 
that the administrative process required significant judicial 
supervision.274 (It is fair to note, however, that the problems facing our 
own “administrative state” are far more complex than theirs.) 
customs and postal regulations, the administrative of veterans’ pensions, and various licensing 
regimes,” but were more skeptical about state-level agencies that set rates that public utilities
could charge. Schiller, supra note 252, at 408 (footnotes omitted); see also Tushnet, supra note 91, 
at 368 (quoting Schiller).
 270. JAFFE, supra note 27, at 320. On the influence of this remark, see Caleb Nelson,
“Standing” and Remedial Rights in Administrative Law, 105 VA. L. REV. 703, 787–88 (2019). For
a brief and illuminating discussion of Jaffe and of other approaches to the legitimacy of the
administrative state, see Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan
on the Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2463 n.1, 2465 n.3 (2017) (discussing briefly
other approaches to the legitimacy of the administrative state). 
271. See Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 1 n.6, 3 n.17 (collecting sources). 
272. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, supra note 30, at 604–05, laments the 
reduced level of judicial protection accorded to property rights which he thinks reached its nadir
in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). 
273. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). But see Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418–20 (2019)
(rejecting petitioner’s contention that Auer deference, whereby courts defer to an agency’s
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, was inconsistent with § 706’s requirement that
reviewing courts should “determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action” 
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706)).
274. The story is splendidly told in DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014). Progressives feared that the 
term “jurisdictional fact” in Crowell would mean any “significant” fact. Tushnet, supra note 91,
at 376. If so, that would have crippled the process of administrative adjudication because the 
reviewing courts would need to redetermine all such facts de novo and on their own record.
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As I write, the modern administrative state is now under sustained 
attack.275 A major focus of that attack centers upon administrative 
adjudication, and there, Hart’s insistence on a judicial duty of law 
declaration is making a significant modern-day comeback.
“Restricted” (i.e., APA-type) judicial review of administrative action
is, of course, the norm in all sorts of areas.276 But the Justices are clearly 
uncomfortable with binding deference to agency law formulation, and 
Marbury v. Madison is sometimes (incorrectly, I believe) invoked in 
support.277 Moreover, the Court itself has significantly backed away
from Chevron deference.278 In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court
imposed formal constraints on Chevron deference.279 In Michigan v.
EPA, it rejected Chevron because of agency structural error in failing 
to consider all the relevant factors.280 And in King v. Burwell, the Court 
seemed to hold that Chevron deference was inapplicable to major legal 
questions.281 Moreover, Chevron has no purchase in the criminal
context.282 Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch were (and are) clearly 
willing to go further in rolling back Chevron.283 
275. Gillian Metzger’s recent Harvard Foreword, discussed supra note 267, provides a 
comprehensive account and rejection of the wide range of political, legal, and rhetorical attacks
employed in that service. See also Beermann, supra note 267, at 1599.
 276. See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 23.
 277. See, e.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1322 (2016). 
278. Much—very much—ink has been spilled on Chevron, as everyone knows. For a 
comprehensive survey of the case law both at the Supreme Court and circuit level, as well as an
excellent review of the literature, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2437–38 (2018). 
279. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–30 (2001). For a vigorous recent defense
of Chevron, see Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 937, 992–93 (2018) (arguing that deference is not a result of a congressional delegation of
“interpretive” authority to agencies but rather a delegation of policymaking authority). 
280. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–07 (2015).
281. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015); see also Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 
1765, 1773–77 (2019) (declining to apply Chevron in the context of what constituted “final” agency
action). But see City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296–97 (2013) (holding, in a 5–4 opinion 
authored by Justice Scalia, that Chevron deference should be accorded to an agency’s
interpretation of the scope of its own regulatory authority).
 282. See Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 352–53 (2014) (detailing a statement of
Scalia, J., with Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). For an argument that Chevron
deference should apply to Department of Justice interpretations of criminal statutes, see Dan M.
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 470–71 (1996). 
And what of statutes that are enforced both civilly and criminally? For more information, see
DANIEL C. RICHMAN, KATE STITH & WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES 880–83 
(2d ed. 2018) (carefully exploring this topic).
 283. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2713 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“These cases bring 
into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to
countenance in the name of Chevron deference.”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 
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Chevron’s decline was particularly evident in the Court’s 2017
Term. Despite apparent opportunities to do so, no decision applied the 
doctrine. In SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, for example, decided along with 
Oil States, four dissenting Justices invoked Chevron to resolve what 
they thought was an ambiguity in the patent statute.284 The Court,
however, in an opinion written by Justice Gorsuch, held that the agency
rule was clearly contrary to the statute.285 There was no need, Justice
Gorsuch said, to resolve a conflict between the parties, which he 
described as involving Chevron deference on the one hand and pre-
Chevron cases that stood for the proposition that the courts decide 
legal issues on the other.286 Later in the 2017 Term, the Court, with 
Justice Gorsuch again authoring the opinion, found another statutory
issue too clear for Chevron deference, but the opinion went out of its 
way to note that no litigant had sought the doctrine’s 
reconsideration.287 The Court’s complete failure to apply Chevron
during the Term elicited comments from Justices Kennedy and Alito.288 
1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at 1158 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“We
managed to live with the administrative state before Chevron. We could do it again.”); see also
Heather Elliott, Justice Gorsuch’s Would-Be War on Chevron, 21 GREEN BAG 2d 315, 319–20 
(2018). Outside of the D.C. Circuit, there is reason to believe that many circuit judges find
Chevron troubling. See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the
Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Court of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 
1348 (2018). 
284. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1360 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
 285. Id. at 1355 (majority opinion)
 286. Id. at 1358. For an even more recent example of an allegedly “clear” statute, see Sturgeon
v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1080 n.3 (2019) (rejecting contrary administrative construction).
287. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629–30 (2018). Justice Gorsuch added that
deference was also inappropriate when “reconciliation” of two federal statutes was at issue. Id. at 
1629. 
288. E.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting his “concern with the way in which the Court’s opinion in [Chevron] has come to be
understood and applied”); id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of “simply 
ignoring Chevron”); see also Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018)
(concluding there is “no ambiguity for the agency to fill” under Chevron deference); id. at 2078
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting he “would give weight to the interpretation of the Government
agency”); Scenic Am., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 138 S. Ct. 2, 3 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., with Roberts,
C.J., and Alito, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (strongly suggesting that Chevron has no
place in administrative agency contract disputes with private parties); Garco Constr., Inc. v. Speer,
138 S. Ct. 1052, 1052 (2018) (Thomas, J., with Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari
in a case involving Auer deference). The attack on Chevron is shared by various legal academics
as well. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These
Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 750–51 (2014); Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84. GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1249 (2016) (noting the difficulty of determining statutory questions without
Chevron is “no excuse for failing to confront the less difficult constitutional questions raised”).
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It is interesting that, until the penultimate day of the 2018 Term in 
Kisor v. Wilkie,289 members of the Court, unlike academic 
commentators, seemed inclined to pay no real attention to the 
relevance of § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. That statute 
appeared to be no more than a remote background when it came to the
scope of judicial review. 
B. Administrative Deprivations of Liberty and Property 
“[T]he whole point of the [traditional] ‘public rights’ analysis was 
that no judicial involvement at all was required,” so wrote my colleague
Peter Strauss.290 Hart strongly resisted any such principle.291 Hart first
clarified his claim. This is the only point in which he gives a nod to the 
public rights doctrine, and even then, he only does so implicitly:
It’s perfectly obvious that final authority to determine even questions 
of law can be given to executive or administrative officials in many 
situations not having the direct impact on private persons of a 
governmentally created and judicially enforceable duty, or of an
immediate deprivation of liberty or property by extra-judicial 
action.292 
As I have said, in Hart’s time, the idea of unreviewable
administrative coercion of liberty or property rights was wholly
anathema to legal traditions.293 Writing within that tradition, Hart’s 
focus was on the possibility of gaining access to an Article III court, 
289. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
 290. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 632 (1984). Professor Fallon characterizes this statement
as “misleading and pernicious,” Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 
1129, but he acknowledges that this is the “[c]onventional wisdom.” Id. at 1050. See also Oil States
Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373–74 (2018) (plurality
opinion) (describing limitations to judicial interpretation of “public rights” analyses).
 291. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 354.
 292. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1386. Hart continues:
These cases, by and large, are those falling in the third of Justice Curtis’ three classes
in Murray’s Lessee. Some such situations may rise to the dignity of a constitutional
problem. But whatever the constitutional rights to judicial process of these plaintiffs
may be, the power of Congress to impair them seems to involve no distinctive problems.
The problems appear to be the same as those discussed in the next section. 
Id. (footnote omitted). When Hart wrote, the “[c]onventional wisdom” was that “Article III and
the Due Process Clause required no judicial review of government decisions involving ‘public
rights’ or ‘privileges’ such as claims of entitlement to benefits or gratuities.” Fallon, Jurisdiction-
Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1050; see also Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 16
(describing historical limitations to “judicial control of administrative law-interpretation”). 
293. See Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 1 & nn.5–6, 3 & n.17, 4 & n.27 (citing relevant
sources).
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despite congressional barriers. His premise here seems to have been 
that “the function of the courts is not one of review but essentially of
control—the function of keeping [agencies] within their statutory
authority.”294 One could certainly interpret Hart’s words to require
only ultra vires review. 
Habeas jurisdiction was Hart’s testing ground. When he wrote, 
habeas jurisdiction depended upon a statutory grant.295 The Dialogue
considered the possibility of excising any unconstitutional limitations 
on the then-existing statutorily authorized jurisdiction. This is where 
Hart enlarged upon his severability analysis. Having enacted habeas 
legislation, all future congressional limitations on the writ could be 
examined for their validity.296 Boumediene seems to reflect that
approach.297 
Much of Hart’s focus centered on detention in connection with
administrative proceedings to exclude or deport (now remove) 
immigrants.298 He recoiled from the Court’s then-recent decisions that
apparently rested on the premise that any process specified by 
Congress constituted due process.299 Whether Hart got the content of 
existing immigration-law doctrine, apart from its “reasoning,” correct 
is unnecessary to explore here.300 Moreover, the specific case law
discussed in The Dialogue has been overtaken by more recent 
developments in the field, and extended treatment of these 
294. Id. at 27 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 89 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original)).
 295. See The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1397 (quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 
93 (1807)).
296. It is not clear whether this was because of Article III, the Suspension Clause, or due 
process.
 297. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008) (holding that a statutory restriction
upon an existing habeas jurisdictional grant was invalid).
 298. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1387–1402. 
299. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned.”).
300. There is a substantial basis to doubt that Hart accurately described the substantive
content of the then-existing immigration law, as opposed to some of the Court’s then-recent 
rhetorical flourishes. See, e.g., Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative
State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 77, 83, 87 (2017); Polly J. Price, A “Chinese Wall” at the Nation’s Borders:
Justice Stephen Field and The Chinese Exclusion Case, 43 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 7, 13 (2018); see also
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1248–50 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing separation
of powers and nondelegation).
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developments is beyond the scope of this essay.301 Thus, I will only 
outline his discussion on this topic in broad generalities.
For Hart, the cases he examined were about potential violations 
of the rule of law: arbitrary and judicially uncontrolled administrative 
detention with respect to “liberty” in the immigration–deportation 
context. Whatever the nineteenth-century view of such detention, Hart 
believed that liberty in its most basic sense was implicated and that the 
judicial function was to ensure that the government acted in a non-
arbitrary manner. This was part of his emphasis on limited government,
which in his (and our) era involved control of the administrative 
bureaucracy. And there is no suggestion—none at all—that the public-
versus-private right distinction should have any controlling significance 
in this context.302 
When Hart wrote, habeas corpus was the mode of review in 
immigration cases.303 Hart did not examine the scope of the court’s 
obligations in that context.304 His focus was simply to insist on the need 
301. The changes continue to be significant in perhaps rejecting or limiting the core
assumptions of the plenary power doctrine. Kristin A. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the
Family in Morales-Santana, 131 HARV. L. REV. 170, 197 n.159 (2017) (collecting sources). 
302. For a survey of the current developments in this area, see Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping
Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1120–22. The 2017 Term’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 
S. Ct. 830 (2018), is a graphic recent example that a narrow majority of the Court is quite
unsympathetic to procedural unfairness claims in this context, even though they make no
reference to the public rights doctrine. A sharply divided Court denied that federal statutory law
permitted bail hearings for immigration detainees but remanded for a determination whether the
Constitution itself might require such relief. Id. at 851. The remand accords, in principle, with
Hart’s belief that due process requires access to some court in these circumstances. Jennings
would, however, provide little real comfort to Hart. Whether a majority of the Court will find a 
due process violation seems problematic to me. 
303. See Developments in the Law: Remedies Against the United States and its Officials, 70
HARV. L. REV. 827, 921–22 (1957) (observing that, since Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915), 
“[h]abeas corpus has . . . served as the main road to review of actions of the immigration service”).
304. Was habeas simply a vehicle for the vindication of any substantive and procedural Due
Process Clause claims, or was it content independently drawn from the nature of habeas corpus 
itself, which could import a standard of review greater than that required by due process? See
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008) (stating that at an “absolute minimum,” the content
of habeas review is no less than it was as of 1789 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001))).
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, believed that habeas corpus was simply the vehicle
for vindication of due process claims and not itself an independent source of standards of review.
Id. at 804–05. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Or did the content of habeas inhere in Article III itself, 
even though the habeas court is not in the position of an enforcement court? Hart says: “That 
principle forbids a constitutional court with jurisdiction in habeas corpus from ever accepting as
an adequate return to the writ the mere statement that what has been done is authorized by act
of Congress.” The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1394. This reference to habeas corpus, of course, is
a clear recognition that these are “external” limitations on the power of Congress to limit the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of Article III courts. Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra
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64 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
for judicial review of the administrative interference with liberty. At
various points, Hart suggests that this review be robust;305 at others, he
asserts that the scope of judicial review depends on the context.306 
The habeas cases were a microcosm of a larger problem addressed 
in this part of The Dialogue, which was concerned with securing access 
to an Article III court. It was decidedly less concerned with what
happened once access was obtained.307 The scope of judicial review of 
the challenged administrative conduct might turn upon the precise
nature of the challenged administrative conduct and upon the nature 
of the administrative process involved.308 The issues raised are
complex, and they seem context specific. But a right of judicial access 
draws on traditions more pervasive than just Boumediene, and here, 
the fact that the state courts are open may matter. 
The substantive legal principles that Hart seems to have believed 
are implicated in Article III courts’ control over administrative
coercion are also unclear. Most of the relevant discussion from The 
Dialogue centers on arbitrary administrative deprivations of liberty
and property, but nowhere does Hart identify the substantive sources 
of those limits on such government conduct. Why can’t Congress 
arbitrarily expel a class of aliens?309 Hart doesn’t say. His focus was
quite clearly on the administrative bureaucracy and the need to control 
it judicially. Hart could be understood to say that, whatever the power 
note 28, at 1067. Does it matter whether the executive detention is alleged to have violated a
statute or the Constitution itself?
 305. Hart wrote:
The great and generating principle of this whole body of law—that the Constitution
always applies when a court is sitting with jurisdiction in habeas corpus. For then the
court has always to inquire, not only whether the statutes have been observed, but
whether the petitioner before it has been ‘deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law,’ or injured in any other way in violation of the fundamental law.
The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1393. 
306. See id. at 1393 n.93 (illustrating how context matters); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at
779–80 (same). 
307. That review was often restricted, of course, but “[r]estricted review implicates not the
right to judicial review, but its scope.” Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, at 23. 
308. Richard Fallon’s remarks are yet again instructive:
[I]ssues involving congressional preclusion of judicial jurisdiction are often bound up
with issues involving the permissible use of non-Article III federal tribunals such as
legislative courts and administrative agencies. . . . Even when initial adjudication by a
non-Article III tribunal is permissible, the Constitution may mandate the availability 
of either appellate review or some other mode of access to an Article III court. 
Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1135.
309. For a bold effort to cabin the reach of the “plenary power” doctrine, see Emma Kaufman,
Segregation by Citizenship, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1418–33 (2019). 








   
    
   
   








   
    
    





   
  
  
   
    




   
 652019] JURISDICTION STRIPPING CIRCA 2020
of Congress to act arbitrarily, such authority cannot be vested in the 
bureaucracy!310 But why not? 
C. Remedies
Hart’s fear of manipulation extended to concern about 
congressional control over judicial remedies.311 To be sure, The 
Dialogue radiates a premise that constitutionally adequate remedies 
should—indeed, they must—be available when there has been a 
governmental deprivation of traditional conceptions of liberty or
property. But that idea was left largely undeveloped. Hart started from 
the proposition that Congress had wide latitude over Article III court 
remedies and their timing.312 But habeas aside, The Dialogue had very 
little to say on this general topic. Hart believed that injunctions—as 
opposed to tort actions—were an exceptional remedy.313 Hart’s world 
is long gone.314 Indeed, since Hart wrote, the Court seems to be moving
310. Hart stated:
Before long, however, [the Court] began to see . . . that a power to lay down general
rules, even if it were plenary, did not necessarily include a power to be arbitrary or to
authorize administrative officials to be arbitrary. It saw that, on the contrary, the very
existence of a jurisdiction in habeas corpus, coupled with the constitutional guarantee 
of due process, implied a regime of law. It saw that in such a regime the courts had a 
responsibility to see that statutory authority was not transgressed, that a reasonable 
procedure was used in exercising the authority, and—seemingly also—that human
beings were not unreasonably subjected, even by direction of Congress, to an
uncontrolled official discretion.
The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1390. 
311. Id. at 1366–70. 
312. Id. at 1366. 
313. Id. at 1369. 
314. That view had plausible support. See generally James E. Pfander, Dicey’s Nightmare: An
Essay on the Rule of Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 737 (discussing common-law and statutory remedies
to military encroachments on private rights). As Professor Fallon observes, however, it does not
now. See Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1112 (providing examples
of recent scholarship that altered traditional presumptions). I would add that, when Hart wrote,
some case law did exist that held that an injunction could be a constitutionally necessary remedy,
most saliently where the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case that legislatively or
administratively prescribed rates were confiscatory. (The theory, of course, was that the 
expropriated rates could never be effectively recovered.) Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
also seems to be premised on that basis. The Court granted a preliminary injunction against a
threatened criminal prosecution because the legislative penalty scheme was clearly designed to
deter anyone from challenging the allegedly confiscatory rates. Id. at 145–46. In the First 
Amendment area, I have argued that a preliminary injunction against a threatened criminal
prosecution was also mandatory to prevent abridgement of First-Amendment rights. See generally
Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” supra note 223. Subsequent case law is
unilluminating on these issues, largely because the courts—contrary to Hart—are now quite 
comfortable with issuing declaratory and injunctive relief. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 
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toward a general conception that, prospective relief aside, judicial
sanctions (e.g., damages or suppression of evidence) cannot be
awarded absent a judicial conclusion of inexcusable “fault” by the 
relevant government official. This is surely the thrust of the Court’s 
recent official immunity cases and of its Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule decisions, which increasingly hold that evidence need 
not be excluded unless the officer was at fault in ignoring Fourth 
Amendment limitations.315 
That said, however, in cases involving challenges to significant
deprivations of liberty or property, the Court has been on the whole
very receptive to ensure adequate judicial access for prospective
relief.316 In any event, Hart believed (although he did not develop the
point) that the state courts provided the ultimate safeguard for the 
protection of due process rights.317 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
The Dialogue, a mere casebook fragment, still remains the 
mesmerizing starting point for anyone interested in congressional 
1804–06 (1991) (describing judicial recognition of new rights but not individual damage 
remediation); see also Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1108–17.
 315. See, e.g., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 1078–79; Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve
Lakier, Apparent Fault, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1546–56 (2018). The authors describe a similar
pattern in the substantive federal criminal law. Id. at 1556–64. They ascribe both developments to
intellectual and cultural emphasis on individual responsibility in recent decades. Id. at 1584–97. 
Further, on remedial restrictiveness with a focus on the immigration or citizenship context, see
Collins, supra note 301, at 214–17, and of course, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). On
“necessary” remedies, see generally Fourteenth Amendment – Due Process Clause – Criminal
Procedure – Nelson v. Colorado, 131 HARV. L. REV. 283 (2017).
 316. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222–23 (2011); Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 792 (2008); see also Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1116– 
17 n.341. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak  (Patchak I), 567
U.S. 209, 212 (2012), provides an excellent example, as well. The Court’s recent decision in
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370–71 (2018), is a more recent
reminder of this fact. See also Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 978 (2019) (discussing the
importance of evaluating government statutory readings to preserve access to judicial remedies);
cf. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1046 (2019) (illustrating that the fact that Congress authorizes
private parties to sue for a violation of the Stored Communications Act may not be enough to
establish Article III standing for damages). 
317. The Dialogue, supra note 4, at 1363–64. Hart made no effort to address the implications
of cases like Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871), which, after all, was—and is—a principal
case in the casebook. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 427. But it is fair to believe that he
thought, as I do, that it was not based on the Constitution itself. See Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping
Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1061 n.78, 1085 (providing support from prior case law and
discussing Tarble’s Case explicitly).
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control of the Article III courts. That essay left us with lots of issues.
Sixty-six years later, they are still with us: 
• With respect to the Supreme Court, it seems pretty clear that the 
Court will strenuously and successfully avoid reading any statute
as barring constitutional review.318 Indeed, counsel will be
reluctant to advance any such argument. Moreover, with great
deference to the Hatter and others, if faced with such a
jurisdiction-stripping statute, I believe that a majority of the 
Court would invalidate a limitation on the Court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction where a substantial purpose of such legislation is to
foreclose its consideration of a properly presented constitutional 
question. That result may be less probable with respect to
limitations on the lower federal courts, particularly if the state
courts remain open.
• Jurisdiction stripping in the statutory context presents different
issues. Perhaps, as the Patchak II plurality states, such legislation
should be upheld when Congress could have retroactively 
changed the applicable substantive law.319 Ultimately, such a 
conclusion would be grounded in McCulloch v. Maryland, which 
recognized that Congress is invested with considerable flexibility
in choosing among means to permissible ends.320 
• Hart’s sharp distinction between enforcement and non-
enforcement courts has had little traction. But it captures, in part, 
important intuitions. At least with respect to administrative 
invasion of common-law rights (i.e., extra-judicial coercion), the 
Court is moving strongly along Hart’s path regarding law 
declaration.321 But I doubt that it will overthrow Crowell’s
318. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018), is only a recent example. For another example, 
see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016) (reserving the question of 
whether a statute banning judicial review of certain administrative decisions applies to
constitutional questions).
319. Consider the portal-to-portal cases, for example. Suppose that Congress had simply
stripped the courts of subject-matter jurisdiction rather than coupling such a provision with a
substantive overruling of the Court’s holding. Arguably, the question which the Court should set 
for itself is whether a substantive change in the applicable substantive law would have been
permissible, and if so, whether the jurisdiction stripping should be viewed as essentially 
accomplishing that.
320. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); cf. Fallon, Jurisdiction-
Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1103 (noting that Battaglia upheld jurisdiction stripping
after its merits determination that no constitutionally protected rights had been invaded). For 
more on this point, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239–40 (1995), and HART 
AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 92.  
321. This would be in part a return to earlier understandings. “In the domain of agency
adjudication of private parties’ legally enforceable duties to one another under federal law, it
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holding with respect to “ordinary” facts.322 To prevent regulatory
agencies from creating and evaluating their own record would 
effectively destroy the modern administrative state.323 The Court 
is unlikely to impose more control mechanisms than those 
imposed by Crowell. Indeed, on several occasions it has endorsed
Crowell’s fanciful “adjuncts” explanation.324 Whether as a matter
of general judicial reasoning or because of § 706 of the APA, one 
can expect more stringent judicial supervision of administrative 
decision-making. Weyerhaeuser Co. vs. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service,325 decided at the beginning of the 2018 Term, is
illustrative. A unanimous Court made clear that, unless a statute 
clearly precluded judicial review, a strong presumption existed 
that administrative conduct was reviewable.326 The Court went on
to say that the APA’s exclusion of review for matters “committed
to agency discretion” barred review only when no meaningful
legal standard existed that could be applied.327 
is . . . hard to deny that current practice and modern doctrine have wandered far from the original
constitutional understanding.” Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, supra note 28, at 1123. 
322. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56 (1932).
323. What I find puzzling is the significance of common-law rights in the modern regulatory
context. The common law was and is a wholly inadequate mechanism for dealing with the complex 
regulatory problems of modern society. How to regulate air or water pollution is well beyond any 
judicially fashioned conception of the law of nuisance. Yet, without discussing it, the Court seems
to treat this kind of litigation as falling within the common-law liberty and property paradigm.
That creates problems.
 324. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S.
442, 450 n.7 (1977) (stating that, in cases which only involve private rights, the “Court has accepted
factfinding by an administrative agency, without intervention by a jury, only as an adjunct to an
Art. III court, analogizing the agency to a jury or a special master and permitting it in admiralty
cases to perform the function of the special master”); see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 78 (1982) (plurality opinion) (“[T]his Court has sustained the use of 
adjunct factfinders even in the adjudication of constitutional rights . . . .”).
 325. See Weyerhaeuser Co. vs. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018). Justice 
Kavanaugh did not participate in this decision. Weyerhaeuser was reaffirmed in Department of
Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2568 (2019).
 326. Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. at 370.
 327. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2018)). Until recently, post-Hart administrative-law 
scholars downplayed the importance of the courts in controlling the administrative state. See, e.g., 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Administrative States: Beyond Presidential Administration, 98 TEX. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 55) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). For example,
in a forthcoming book, FORTRESS OF LIBERTY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE DRAFT AND THE
REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW, to be published by Harvard University Press, my colleague, 
Jeremy Kessler, emphasizes that there was an important strain of progressive legal thought
emphasizing the importance of the strong administrative state (and not the courts) in protecting
civil liberties. That strain, however, did not diminish the strong belief of the courts and of the bar
regarding the importance of the judicial role in that regard. The Dialogue and Professor Jaffe’s
work attest to this point. See, e.g., JAFFE, supra note 27, at 379–80. 
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• Chevron has generally been treated as a case of (supposed) 
legislative delegation with respect to statutory—not
constitutional—meaning.328 I do not doubt Congress’s power to 
issue such instructions that courts must respect, subject to some
conception of ultra vires limits. But that aside, the courts must
yield something to administrative determinations with respect to
such matters as the precise regulation of ambient air quality. And
if they do, that has to fit within the APA formula. Perhaps, even 
under the major questions doctrine, the Court should employ
Chevron when the challenged legal proposition is tightly 
interlocked with an agency’s technical expertise.329 Or as then-
Judge Kavanaugh reformulated it: courts would supply the “best 
reading” of the statute, deferring to administrative construction
only when the statute contains broad language that is suggestive
of legislative delegation.330 After all, the end result of such an 
allocation makes sense. 
• On December 10, 2018, the Court granted review in Kisor v. 
Wilkie.331 The grant seemed designed to overturn so called Auer
deference—judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its
own ambiguous regulation.332 “The only question presented here
is whether we should overrule . . . . Auer deference,” said Justice 
Kagan in her opinion.333 
328. Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2019); see Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and 
Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2473 n.47
(2017) (referring to Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 5, and stating, “Monaghan’s formalist,
delegation-based rationale for reconciling the rule of (judicially declared) law with the
administrative state was eventually elevated into the official justification for Chevron deference” 
(citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–29 (2001))). Any such relationship is, 
needless to say, temporal, not causal.
 329. See Sharkey, supra note 278, at 2438. Professor Sharkey’s approach is entirely functional.
Justice Breyer expressed similar views a long time ago: “Would one not expect courts to conduct
a stricter review of matters of law, where courts are more expert, but more lenient review of
matters of policy, where agencies are more expert?” Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions 
of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN L. REV. 363, 397 (1986). 
330. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Keynote Address: Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire: 
Statutory Ambiguity and Constitutional Exceptions, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1907, 1912–13
(2017); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2153–54 
(2016) (book review) (describing this attempt at clarification). To the extent that Chevron rests
upon a theory of delegated authority, there seems little room for argument based on waiver or
estoppel, even if the agency does not raise the claim. See Note, Waiving Chevron Deference, 132
HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1528–29 (2019) (describing the shortcomings of waiver when permitting the 
government’s position to shift with administrative changes).
331. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018) (granting certiorari).
 332. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (establishing Auer deference).
333. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019).
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In an elaborate concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch, four
Justices would have said yes.334 To the surprise of many, however, 
the Court said no. Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion advanced a 
vigorous defense of Auer on both legal and policy grounds,
including stare decisis.335 A brief concurrence by Chief Justice 
Roberts emphasized the latter grounds.336 What is most striking
is the decision’s import for Chevron. Much of Justice Gorsuch’s 
reasoning is fully applicable to Chevron deference. But Justice 
Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, explicitly disclaimed any 
such implication, as did the Chief Justice.337 Moreover, the 
plurality opinion’s reasoning seems readily applicable to
Chevron, which the plurality frequently cited.
And so, it seems safe to say that Chevron deference—whatever 
its ultimate form—seems quite safe for now. Article III does not 
require that the court independently determine all statutory 
meaning. But the “whatever” is important. The plurality sharply 
criticized cabined Auer deference in much the same way that
Chevron has been confined. Indeed, in Kisor, the Chief Justice 
wondered whether, at the end of the day, there was much 
difference on the ground between the plurality and the dissent.338 
All in all, lots of difficult problems still to wrestle with—just what 
The Dialogue taught us would be the case.
334. See id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“It should have been easy for the Court to say
goodbye to Auer v. Robbins.”). 
335. Justice Kagan insisted that there was a “presumption” that Congress intended that the
agency resolve any ambiguities. Id. at 2412 (plurality opinion). She brushed aside APA § 706(1)
with the observation that, while it required the court to decide legal issues, it did not detail how
to decide them. See id. at 2419 (“[E]ven when a court defers to a regulatory reading, it acts
consistently with Section 706. That provision does not specify the standard of review a court 
should use in ‘determin[ing] the meaning’ of an ambiguous rule.” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706)
(alteration in original)). Justice Gorsuch thought that was an “anemic” reading of the statute. Id.
at 2432 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
336. Id. at 2424–25 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
 337. Justice Kavanaugh’s articles, supra note 330, are inconsistent with such a view.
 338. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2424. 
